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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)(j) because the appeal has been transferred to this Court from the Utah Supreme
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issue on appeal is whether Appellant Neil B. Baird, DDS ("Dr. Baird") is
bound by a settlement agreement reached on July 7, 2009 between Plaintiff NAR, Inc.
("NAR") and Defendant/Appellee Aubrie Vermillion ("Vermillion"), which resolved all
claims between NAR and Vermillion (the "Settlement Agreement"), where (1) Dr. Baird
was not a party to, did not participate in the negotiation, and did not execute the
Settlement Agreement; (2) neither Dr. Baird nor his counsel was informed that the
Settlement Agreement waived, or even related to, Dr. Baird's pending motions for
attorney's fees; (3) the Court did not make an inquiry on the record that Dr. Baird
understood or agreed that the Settlement Agreement impacted his rights under Dr.
Baird's pending motions for attorney's fees; (4) a copy of the Agreement was never
provided to Dr. Baird or his counsel; (5) Dr. Baird only appeared at the trial on July 7,
2009 as a fact witness; and (6) the Court made a Minute Entry finding that Dr. Baird was
not "a party of interest" in the litigation.
"Settlement agreements are governed by the rules applied to general contract
actions." Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 215 P.3d 933, 939 (Utah 2009). Accordingly,
the standard of review is for correctness. Id. at 938 ("We review a district court's
interpretation of a contract for correctness, giving no deference to the district court.")
1
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STATEMENT OF PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE
The issue presented for review was brought before and ruled upon by the District
Court. (R. 1041-1043 (Addendum "3"); 1075-1077 (Addendum "4"))
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Dr. Baird performed dental services for Vermillion. Vermillion did not pay Dr.
Baird for the services performed. Dr. Baird assigned the debt to NAR for collection.
NAR filed a collection lawsuit against Vermillion seeking approximately $1,000, plus
interest. Vermillion asserted a counterclaim against NAR. Dr. Baird was never a party to
the lawsuit, but was deposed as a fact witness and designated to testify at trial.
Course of Proceedings
Though he was never a party to the litigation, Dr. Baird was forced to incur more
than $10,000 of attorney fees to protect his individual interests from the conduct of
Vermillion and her counsel. Dr. Baird brought three separate motions for attorney fees.
The District Court did not rule on Dr. Baird's motions, and instead reserved the motions
for later determination. On the day of trial, NAR and Vermillion negotiated and entered
into a Settlement Agreement. A term of the Settlement Agreement was that each party
was to bear their own attorney fees and costs. After Dr. Baird and his counsel were
notified of the settlement,1 Dr. Baird requested a decision on his pending motions for
attorney fees. The District Court found that Dr. Baird was bound by NAR and

1

Neither Dr. Baird nor his counsel ever received a copy of the Settlement Agreement.
i
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Vermillion's Settlement Agreement, and thus denied Dr. Baird's motions for attorney
fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Dr. Baird assigned a Vermillion's debt to NAR for collection. (R. 964-982,
Exhibit B; Addendum "5").
2. NAR filed a collection action against Vermillion seeking approximately $1,000,
plus interest (R. 1-4) The debt consisted of unpaid dental services. Id
3. Vermillion asserted a counterclaim against NAR. (R. 344-352)
4. Dr. Baird was not a party to the action. (R. 178-179)
5. As a result of perceived discovery abuses, Dr. Baird necessarily incurred attorney
fees exponentially in excess of the amount in dispute in the underlying action. For
example, as found by the District Court, Vermillion issued an overly broad
subpoena that requested privileged information concerning Dr. Baird's other
patients, (R, 12-37; 38-55; 390-393) and Vermillion unreasonably refused to
cooperate with Dr. Baird concerning the scheduling of Dr. Baird's deposition. (R.
56-71; 207-224; 240-247; 390-393) Additionally, fees were unnecessarily
incurred to oppose Vermillion's counsel's position that Dr. Baird was not entitled
to have his counsel present at his deposition, (R. 484-554, Exhibit B, Aff.
Coulter) As a result of such conduct, Dr. Baird was forced to incur unnecessary
attorney fees.
6. Further, Vermillion filed a Motion to Compel and Motion for Sanctions against
Dr. Baird. (R. 56-71) On September 11, 2007, the Trial Court ruled that
3
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Vermillion's Motion was "inappropriate," and the Court made a specific finding
that Dr. Baird was not "a party of interest" in the litigation. (R. 178-179)
7. Contrary to the Court's findings, Vermillion continued to argue in motions filed
with the District Court that Dr. Baird was a real "party of interest" in the litigation,
and that Vermillion's Motion to Compel and Motion for Sanctions Against Dr.
Baird was still pending. (R. 207-224)
8. On April 21,2008, the Trial Court granted Dr. Baird5s Motion to Quash
Vermillion's Subpoena and specifically found (1) that Dr. Baird was not a real
party in interest, and Vermillion's claim otherwise was without merit, (2) that
"reasonable efforts were undertaken by both Dr. Baird and his counsel to produce
documents fairly relevant to the issues in this lawsuit," (3) that "Defendant took
advantage of proffered documents, but never made any effort to cooperate in
setting a more convenient date for the deposition," (4) that "despite defendant's
statement that he (sic) was not seeking overbroad or burdensome discovery, the
Subpoena itself belies that contention." (R. 306-313)
9. Based on the foregoing conduct of Vermillion and her counsel directed toward Dr.
Baird, Dr. Baird made at least three motions for attorney fees. (R. 296-304; 358360; 484-554)
10. The District Court reserved ruling on Dr. Baird's pending motions for attorney
fees on multiple occasions. (R. 306-313; 321; 325-339) On January 14. 2009,
counsel for Dr. Baird understood the District Court's instruction to be that Dr.
Baird should submit a memorandum of points and authorities to support his
4
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pending motions for attorney's fees upon the conclusion of'the underlying dispute
between NAR and Vermillion. (R. 484-554; Addendum "2", at 12:9 - 13:10)
1 l.On July 7,2009, the day trial was scheduled to commence, a Settlement
Agreement was reached which resolved all claims between NAR and Vermillion
Dr. Baird was present on July 7th only as a fact witness. (R.964-982, Exhibit A,
Aff. Dr. Baird) Dr. Baird's counsel was not present. Dr. Baird was not a party to
the settlement negotiations and did not execute the Settlement Agreement. Id. A
copy of the Settlement Agreement was never provided to Dr. Baird or his counsel.
Id.
12. On July 7,2009, NAR and Vermillion stated the terms of their settlement
agreement on the record. (Addendum "1", Partial Trial Transcript, July 7, 2009)
Neither Dr. Baird nor his counsel was informed that the Settlement Agreement
waived, or even related to, Dr. Baird's claims for attorney's fees that were pending
at the time the Settlement Agreement was agreed. Id. The District Court did not
make an inquiry on the record that Dr. Baird understood or agreed that the
Settlement Agreement impacted his rights under Dr. Baird's three pending
motions for attorney's fees. Id. In contrast, the District Court did ask Aubrie
Vermillion and the representative of NAR on the record for their consents to the
Settlement Agreement. Id.
13. On September 30, 2009, after learning the dispute between NAR and Vermillion
had been concluded, Dr. Baird submitted a memorandum in support of his pending
motions for attorney's fees. (R. 484-554)
5
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14. On May 5, 2010 a hearing was held concerning Dr. Baird's motions for attorney's
fees, along with various counter motions filed by Vermillion. (R. 1038)
15. The Court denied Dr. Baird's motions for attorney's fees based upon the District
Court's finding that Dr. Baird was in privity with NAR, and thus bound by the
NAR's and Vermillion's Settlement Agreement. (R. 1041-1043 (Addendum "3"))
16. The Court's July 65 2010 Order, and November 19, 2010 Final Order,2 rendered
moot, and denied, Dr. Baird's pending motions for attorney fees. (R. 1041-1043
(Addendum "3"); 1075-1077 (Addendum "4"))
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Dr. Baird was not a party to this case, or the Settlement Agreement entered into by
NAR and Vermillion. Dr. Baird's interest in the case was limited to being a witness and
claiming attorney fees against Vermillion and her counsel. Dr. Baird is not in privity
with NAR. As such, the Settlement Agreement is not binding upon Dr. Baird. The
pending motions for attorney's fees filed by Dr. Baird against Vermillion and her
counsel, which had been reserved by the Trial Court on multiple occasions, were thus
incorrectly denied as barred by NAR's and Vermillion's Settlement Agreement.
ARGUMENT
L

DR. BAIRD WAS NOT A PARTY TO THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Unless expressly stated otherwise, settlement agreements are only enforceable

against the parties that executed the agreement. "Settlement agreements are governed by

2

The "Final Order" merely clarifies that the District Court's July 6, 2010 Order was its
final order. (R. 1075-1077 (Addendum "4"))
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the rules applied to general contract actions." Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 215 P.3d
933,939 (Utah 2009).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that non-signatory third-parties were not bound
by or subject to a settlement agreement that unambiguously released only the claims
between the parties named in the agreement. Id. at 939-940. In Bodell, there were only
two parties named in the settlement agreement. Id. The settlement agreement
specifically named which parties were released from which claims. Id. There was a
complete lack of language within the settlement agreement indicating that the parties
intended to satisfy all potential tort and contract claims against persons not a party to the
agreement. Id.
Dr. Baird (a non-signatory third party) is not bound by or subject to NAR's and
Vermillion's Settlement Agreement. Dr. Baird was never a party to the lawsuit. Dr.
Baird was not a party to the settlement negotiations and was not a party to any Settlement
Agreement between NAR and Vermillion. Dr. Baird never signed NAR's and
Vermillion's Settlement Agreement. Dr. Baird was merely present at place the settlement
was negotiated because he was designated as a fact witness to testify at the trial. Dr.
Baird never gave his verbal approval of the Settlement Agreement when it was stated into
the record. The District Court did not make an inquiry on the record that Dr. Baird
understood or agreed that the Settlement Agreement impacted his rights under Dr.
Baird's three pending motions for attorney's fees. In contrast, the District Court did ask
Aubrie Vermillion and the representative of NAR on the record for their consents to the
Settlement Agreement. Dr. Baird's counsel never gave his verbal or written approval of
7
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the Settlement Agreement. A copy of the Settlement Agreement was never provided to
Dr. Baird or his counsel. Based on the foregoing, and under Bodell, Dr. Baird is not
bound by or subject to NAR's and Vermillion's Settlement Agreement.
For further support that Dr. Baird was not a party to the Settlement Agreement,
one only has to consider the requirements of Utah Rule Professional Conduct 4.2. Rule
4.2(a) provides: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the
subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another
lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer." Utah R.
Prof. C, 4.2(a). Both NAR's and Vermillion's counsel knew that, at all times relevant,
Dr. Baird was represented by counsel different from NAR's counsel. Dr. Baird"s counsel
was never made aware that Vermillion was negotiating a settlement with Dr. Baird. The
most likely reason why Dr. Baird's counsel was not so notified, is that counsel knew that
only NAR and Vermillion were subject to the Settlement Agreement. Dr. Baird
reasonably presumes that counsel adhered to their professional duties under Rule 4.2.
Otherwise, the negotiations and settlement would have violated standards of
professionalism and Dr. Baird's right to counsel, which would void the agreement as it
applies to Dr. Baird.
Finally, as a practical matter, it would have made absolutely no sense for Dr. Baird
to concede his pending motions for attorney's fees (in excess of $10,000) against
Vermillion and her counsel, when there were not any counter-claims brought against Dr.
Baird. Dr. Baird's had no exposure at trial and risked nothing. Thus, there was a failure
of consideration for the Settlement Agreement as it applies to Dr. Baird.
8
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II.

DR. BAIRD WAS NOT IN PRIVITY WITH NAR, AND THUS CANNOT
BE INDIRECTLY BOUND BY THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Dr. Baird was not in privity with NAR merely because Dr. Baird was designated

witness and deposed in the matter, nor because Dr. Baird may have benefited from an
outcome favorable to NAR at trial.
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly articulated the law on trial witnesses and
privity:
It is widely held that the sole fact that a person is a witness in an action
does not, by itself, establish privity with any of the parties to that action.
To establish privity, the witness also must have had some control over the
litigation
That a witness had some interest in the outcome of the case is
immaterial if he lacked control over the trial
Baxter v. UtahDept Transp., 705 P.2d 1167, 1168-69 (Utah 1985) (emphasis supplied);
see also White Pine Ranches v. Osguthorpe, 731 P.2d 1076, 1077 (Utah 1986) ("privity
cannot be established merely through a witness in a prior proceeding in which the witness
was not a party or did not control a party.") In Baxter, the Supreme Court held that
collateral estoppel could not be invoked because Baxter was not a party to a prior action
concerning the title to certain land adjacent to his own land, even though (1) Baxter was
an expert witness in the prior action, and (2) Baxter would have benefited from a
favorable ruling because it would have validated title to his land. Baxter, 705 P.2d at
1168-69.
Dr. Baird was not in privity with NAR merely because he was a designated
witness and was deposed in preparation for trial. Furthermore, Dr. Baird was not in
privity with NAR because Dr. Baird had absolutely no control over the litigation or the
9
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settlement thereof. In the Assignment Agreement between Dr. Baird and NAR (R. 964982, Exhibit B; Addendum "5"), quoted below, Dr. Baird granted NAR the exclusive
right ("full power") to compromise and settle the claim. NAR and its counsel had sole
control over the litigation—Dr. Baird had none. Further, Privity is not established by Dr.
Baird's contractual right to receive a percentage of the amount collected by NAR.
Similar to Baxter, the Settlement Agreement cannot be enforced against Dr. Baird under
a theory of privity merely because Dr. Baird may have received some benefit from a
litigation outcome favorable to NAR. It is clear that Dr. Baird was not in privity with
NAR as it applies to enforceability of the Settlement Agreement against Dr. Baird.
Additionally, privity cannot be established between Dr. Baird and NAR on the
basis that they represent the "same legal right." Searle Bros v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689,691
(Utah 1978). Dr. Baird's and NAR's legal rights are not the same. Dr. Baird had a legal
right to receive a percentage of money from NAR only if NAR were to collect money
from Vermillion. NAR, as an assignee of the claim, had a legal right to collect from
Vermillion a debt owed. In the Assignment Agreement, Dr. Baird assigned all of his
rights in the debt to NAR, and retained no right to make claims against Vermillion on the
same debt:
[Dr. Baird] hereby transfers, assigns and sets over to NAR, [Dr. Baird's]
claims and demands against all debtors assigned together with all of [Dr.
Baird 'sj rights, title and interest therein, and the demands represented
thereby, and all rights of action accrued or to accrue. [Dr. Baird] further
grants to NAR .. .full power to collect, compromise, reassign, or in any
other manner enforce the collection thereof.

10
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(R. 964-982, Exhibit B; Addendum "5"). By contract, Dr. Baird had no legal interest in
the action brought by NAR against Vermillion. Furthermore, Vermillion had claims
pending against NAR at the time the settlement was reached. Vermillion had no claims
pending against Dr. Baird. Therefore, NAR's interest in settling its exposure in the case
drastically differed from any interest Dr. Baird has in the outcome of the case. Based on
the foregoing, privity cannot be established based upon Dr. Baird and NAR representing
the "same legal right."
In sum, Dr. Baird was not in privity with NAR by reason of the fact that Dr. Baird
was a trial witness, or may have been benefited by a litigation outcome favorable to
NAR, and it is clear that Dr. Baird and NAR do not share the "same legal right."
CONCLUSION
Dr. Baird does not challenge the public policy favoring enforcement of settlement
agreements. However, the Settlement Agreement at issue cannot be enforced against Dr.
Baird because he is not a party to that agreement and is not in legal privity with NAR.
Even if Dr. Baird was a party to, or was in privity with NAR, the Settlement Agreement
still cannot be enforced against Dr. Baird because the Settlement Agreement would have
been negotiated and agreed upon in violation of Dr. Baird's right to counsel, standards of
professionalism, and for a failure of consideration.
For the foregoing reasons, the final order on appeal should be reversed to the
extent it finds that Dr. Baird's pending motions for attorney's fees were barred by the
terms of the Settlement Agreement, and Dr. Baird's motions for attorney's fees should be
remanded to the District Court for hearing and a decision.
11
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DATED this

day of August, 2011.

*kDefek A. Coulter
Robert T. Tateoka
Attorneys for Appellant Neil B. Baird, D.D.S.
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; TUESDAY, JULY 7, 2009, 2:30 P.M.
-oooOooo[Excerpt of proceedings.]
THE COURT:
seated, please.

Okay.

Everyone go ahead and be

We are back on the record with the jury

present in the jury box.
MR. ADY:

Counsel also present.

I believe we would like to approach,

Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Oh, sure.

Come on up.

{Discussion at bench.)
THE COURT:
very quick issue.

We need to excuse you for one more

It should help.

Okay?

Take them back,

Elaine.
(Whereupon, the jury exited the courtroom.)
THE COURT:

Go ahead and be seated.

We are on the record.
on this, counsel.
MR. ADY:

Let me know where you are

Who would like to speak?
I understand that what we've got is

plaintiff will pay the defendant $1,000.

The debt will be -

or the claim for the debt will be extinguished and expunged
from Ms. Vermillion's credit reports, all credit reporting
agencies to which the debt has been - the claimed debt has
been reported will be expunged forthwith.

There will be a

confidentiality provision as to the $1,000 only, that
neither party will disclose it to any other third party.
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They can talk about the settlement; they can't talk about
the $1,000,
And that there will be no ~ it will not be
characterized as a forgiveness of debt, for tax purposes.
There's not going to be any form sent to my client saying
that they've been - I forget the tax number, it escapes me,
of the IRS form.
THE COURT:

It's sort of like a 1099, isn't it?

Or a MR. SCOFIELD:
MR. ADY:

1099.

Yeah, 1099.

be a 1099 sent to them.

There we are.

There won't

And - and we're also going to

release Dr. Baird from any claims as well.
THE COURT:
MR. ADY:

All right.
Is there anything else?

THE COURT:

Is that the agreement, Mr, Scofield?

MR. SCOFIELD:

Let me just clarify my

understanding on the confidentiality of the $1,000 payment.
It's no reference to there being a payment, not necessarily
just the amount.

And the release would be as to NAR, its

officers, agents, Dr. Baird, his officers, agents and both
of their attorneys.
THE COURT:

And, likewise It's meant to be - it's meant to be -

inclusive —
MR. ADY:

Aubrey and Dustin, the other way as

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

well,
THE COURT:
MR. ADY:

All claims both ways.
Yeah.

MR. SCOFIELD:

Right.

And then with respect to

clearing up the credit, I don't know that I necessarily
agree with the "forthwith," but I would say —
THE COURT:

That one struck me.

As soon as you

You wonft get it done forthwith.

reasonably can.

Forthwith

is when they put you in handcuffs and take you through that
door.
MR. ADY:

Right.

THE COURT:

That's forthwith.

MR. SCOFIELD:

Right.

as reasonably practicable.

Well, we 1 11 do is as soon

And I think we should be able to

get a check to them MR. ADY:

I think the language on the credit, if I

may just interpose, NAR does not directly control the
database of credit reporting agencies.
make requests.

All they can do is

Either they're - they're requested, but

there aren't any requests (inaudible).

The language in the

agreement needs to reflect that that is their obligation to
make this request.
MR. SCOFIELD:

Your Honor, the issue is not to

force Experian THE COURT:

But you'll make the request in the -
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in the most effective form you MR. ADY:

Absolutely.

MR. SCOFIELD:

What NAR does, it submits a form

called a UDF or an AUDF, Uniform Data Form, to the credit
furnisher to the credit reporting agency.

And if they send

in - I don't know if they use - I would imagine they're
using Metro 2 and doing the AUDFs.

If you're doing the

Metro 2 format, you simply have to indicate on there that
there is no debt and MR. ADY:

Right.

But they don't have to

(inaudible) occasionally that, but once THE COURT:
MR. ADY:

You're not guaranteed what they do.
Yeah.

Experian's performance.

And we're not going to guarantee
We can only guarantee that NAR will

go through the proper channels, commercially reasonable
channels, that it will use the same format that they
normally use.

There's no reason — NAR doesn't want this on

their — on Ms. Vermillion's credit.

They want to comply.

But there's no reason to saddle any obligations THE COURT:

Mr. Saxton seemed to have a concern.

I don't know if they've resolved the point that you're MR. SAXTON:
Mr. Ady, are outdated.

The funds you're referring to,
We don't use those any more.

an electronic submission now.
MR. ADY:

(Inaudible)•
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It's

1

MR. SAXTON:

It's an electronic submission, not

2

necessarily that, but it is an electronic submission.

3

we'll electronically submit it to have it updated.

4
5

MR. ADY:

Okay.

And

And if - and I guess - you know,

my understanding is they can take it off.

You know, if

6 I they - and our position is that if it doesn't come off,
7

there's not a settlement; is that right?

8 j
9

THE COURT:
road.

Well, I'm not going to go down that

They can only do what they can do.

10

submit, there's not a settlement.

11

of consideration.

12

end...

13
14

That would be a failure

But since they don't control the other

MR. ADY:

Well, that's - that's where the

difference is.

15
16

If they don't

THE COURT:

Then let's bring the jury in.

Because

they can only do what they can do.

17

MR. SCOFIELD:

18

MR. ADY:

Well, and then one thing -

Well, I'm just saying, Chip - Chip, if I

19

call you, you'll help me, right?

20

"Hey, these guys are being butts; will you - will you make a

21

phone call for me?"

22

MR. SAXTON:

If I call you and say,

What I do know - what my experience

23

is, Mr. Ady, I can't direct you as to your - your client

24

directly.

25

of an issue like that, that it's fairly easily cleared up

But my experience is that, if there is some sort
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with the credit reporting agencies.

The person affected

just needs to contact the credit reporting agencies, file a
dispute, the dispute comes back to NAR, and they say, "Hey,
what's going on?"
off."

And they say, "No, take it off.

Take it

And so then it's - it's all done.
MR. SCOFIELD:

I think what we can agree to do is

everything that can be - can be done to notify a credit
reporting agency that there's no debt.
THE COURT:

Well, that's what -

MR. ADY:

I still won't act, then the remedy comes

under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, I think, because
they're reporting a debt that doesn't exist anymore, so MR. SAXTON:
MR. ADY:

And -

Because it's later debt.

And so

you're THE COURT:
MR. ADY:

And you think that's going to happen.

And the reporting cycle's every 30 days.

So you're going to submit it within the next MR, SAXTON:
manually, on demand,
MR. ADY:

We can do it electronically,
So -

Okay.

MR. SAXTON:

- if this happens, I'll call my

office on the way back, tell them to delete it and they'll
electronically submit it to have it deleted,
MR. ADY:

And there's going to be transparency for
8
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us so that we can see what you've done and submitted?
MR. SCOFIELD:
MR. SAXTON:

We'll send you We can send - we can send a notice

that says we've done it.
MR. SCOFIELD:
MR. SAXTON:

Whatever we have consented.
Yeah, we can.

We can do that, you

bet.
THE COURT:
MR. ADY:

So do we have an agreement now?
All right.

THE COURT:

Mr. Scofield, anything else you need

to add?
MR. SCOFIELD:

Just when can we get them a check

and how do you want it made out?
MR. ADY:

Just to me in trust.

MR. SCOFIELD:

You in trust for a thousand.

And the only other point would be those are all
the payments; otherwise, everyone bears their own attorneys
fees, costs and expenses.
THE COURT:

Absolutely.

MR. SCOFIELD:

It's got to be that.

And that's my understanding of the

agreement, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
NAR and (inaudible):

Let me ask Mr. Saxton, as president of
Are you willing to abide by this

agreement as stated, sir?
MR. SAXTON:

Yes, I am.
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THE COURT:

The plaintiff - the party is

Ms. Vermillion, but I'd like to hear from both of you if
you're willing to abide by this.
MR, ADY:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT:
a yes, but I -

Ms. Vermillion, you accept it?

That's

I note - I'm pretty sure no one's happy.

also think you've all done the right thing.

I

And I'm sorry

things had to get to this point,
I'll approve the settlement.

I'll look forward to

concluding documents.
Are you going to draft those, Mr, Scofield?
MR. SCOFIELD:
THE COURT:

I'd be happy to, Your Honor.

Thank you.

May I release the jury?
MR. SCOFIELD:
MR. ADY:
THE COURT:

You may.

You may, sir.
Thank you.

MR. SCOFIELD:

Thank you, Your Honor.

(Whereupon, the hearing was
concluded at 2:39 p.m.)
-000O000-

10
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)(j) because the appeal has been transferred to this Court from the Utah Supreme
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issue on appeal is whether Appellant Neil B. Baird, DDS ("Dr. Baird") is
bound by a settlement agreement reached on July 7, 2009 between Plaintiff NAR, Inc.
("NAR") and Defendant/Appellee Aubrie Vermillion ("Vermillion"), which resolved all
claims between NAR and Vermillion (the "Settlement Agreement"), where (1) Dr. Baird
was not a party to, did not participate in the negotiation, and did not execute the
Settlement Agreement; (2) neither Dr. Baird nor his counsel was informed that the
Settlement Agreement waived, or even related to, Dr. Baird's pending motions for
attorney's fees; (3) the Court did not make an inquiry on the record that Dr. Baird
understood or agreed that the Settlement Agreement impacted his rights under Dr.
Baird's pending motions for attorney's fees; (4) a copy of the Agreement was never
provided to Dr. Baird or his counsel; (5) Dr. Baird only appeared at the trial on July 7,
2009 as a fact witness; and (6) the Court made a Minute Entry finding that Dr. Baird was
not "a party of interest" in the litigation.
"Settlement agreements are governed by the rules applied to general contract
actions." Bodell Constr. Co. v, Robbins, 215 P.3d 933, 939 (Utah 2009). Accordingly,
the standard of review is for correctness. Id. at 938 ("We review a district court's
interpretation of a contract for correctness, giving no deference to the district court.")
1
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STATEMENT OF PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE
The issue presented for review was brought before and ruled upon by the District
Court. (R. 1041-1043 (Addendum "3"); 1075-1077 (Addendum "4"))
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Dr. Baird performed dental services for Vermillion. Vermillion did not pay Dr.
Baird for the services performed. Dr. Baird assigned the debt to NAR for collection,
NAR filed a collection lawsuit against Vermillion seeking approximately $1,000, plus
interest. Vermillion asserted a counterclaim against NAR. Dr. Baird was never a party to
the lawsuit, but was deposed as a fact witness and designated to testify at trial.
Course of Proceedings
Though he was never a party to the litigation, Dr. Baird was forced to incur more
than $10,000 of attorney fees to protect his individual interests from the conduct of
Vermillion and her counsel. Dr. Baird brought three separate motions for attorney fees.
The District Court did not rule on Dr. Baird's motions, and instead reserved the motions
for later determination. On the day of trial, NAR and Vermillion negotiated and entered
into a Settlement Agreement. A term of the Settlement Agreement was that each party
was to bear their own attorney fees and costs. After Dr. Baird and his counsel were
notified of the settlement,1 Dr. Baird requested a decision on his pending motions for
attorney fees. The District Court found that Dr. Baird was bound by NAR and

Neither Dr. Baird nor his counsel ever received a copy of the Settlement Agreement.
i
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Vermillion's Settlement Agreement, and thus denied Dr. Baird's motions for attorney
fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Dr. Baird assigned a Vermillion's debt to NAR for collection. (R. 964-982,
Exhibit B; Addendum "5").
2. NAR filed a collection action against Vermillion seeking approximately $1,000,
plus interest. (R. 1-4) The debt consisted of unpaid dental services. Id.
3. Vermillion asserted a counterclaim against NAR. (R. 344-352)
4. Dr. Baird was not a party to the action. (R. 178-179)
5. As a result of perceived discovery abuses, Dr. Baird necessarily incurred attorney
fees exponentially in excess of the amount in dispute in the underlying action. For
example, as found by the District Court, Vermillion issued an overly broad
subpoena that requested privileged information concerning Dr. Baird's other
patients, (R. 12-37; 38-55; 390-393) and Vermillion unreasonably refused to
cooperate with Dr. Baird concerning the scheduling of Dr. Baird's deposition. (R.
56-71; 207-224; 240-247; 390-393) Additionally, fees were unnecessarily
incurred to oppose Vermillion's counsel's position that Dr. Baird was not entitled
to have his counsel present at his deposition. (R. 484-554, Exhibit B, Aff.
Coulter) As a result of such conduct, Dr. Baird was forced to incur unnecessary
attorney fees.
6. Further, Vermillion filed a Motion to Compel and Motion for Sanctions against
Dr. Baird. (R. 56-71) On September 11, 2007, the Trial Court ruled that
3
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Vermillion's Motion was "inappropriate," and the Court made a specific finding
that Dr. Baird was not "a party of interest" in the litigation. (R. 178-179)
7. Contrary to the Court's findings, Vermillion continued to argue in motions filed
with the District Court that Dr. Baird was a real "party of interest" in the litigation,
and that Vermillion's Motion to Compel and Motion for Sanctions Against Dr.
Baird was still pending. (R. 207-224)
8. On April 21, 2008, the Trial Court granted Dr. Baird's Motion to Quash
Vermillion's Subpoena and specifically found (1) that Dr. Baird was not a real
party in interest, and Vermillion's claim otherwise was without merit, (2) that
"reasonable efforts were undertaken by both Dr. Baird and his counsel to produce
documents fairly relevant to the issues in this lawsuit," (3) that "Defendant took
advantage of proffered documents, but never made any effort to cooperate in
setting a more convenient date for the deposition," (4) that "despite defendant's
statement that he (sic) was not seeking overbroad or burdensome discovery, the
Subpoena itself belies that contention." (R. 306-313)
9. Based on the foregoing conduct of Vermillion and her counsel directed toward Dr.
Baird, Dr. Baird made at least three motions for attorney fees. (R. 296-304; 358360; 484-554)
10. The District Court reserved ruling on Dr. Baird's pending motions for attorney
fees on multiple occasions. (R. 306-313; 321; 325-339) On January 14, 2009,
counsel for Dr. Baird understood the District Court's instruction to be that Dr.
Baird should submit a memorandum of points and authorities to support his
4
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pending motions for attorney's fees upon the conclusion of'the underlying dispute
between NAR and Vermillion. (R. 484-554; Addendum "2", at 12:9 - 13:10)
11. On July 7,2009, the day trial was scheduled to commence, a Settlement
Agreement was reached which resolved all claims between NAR and Vermillion
Dr. Baird was present on July 7th only as a fact witness. (R.964-982, Exhibit A,
Aff. Dr. Baird) Dr. Baird's counsel was not present. Dr. Baird was not a party to
the settlement negotiations and did not execute the Settlement Agreement. Id. A
copy of the Settlement Agreement was never provided to Dr. Baird or his counsel.
Id.
12. On July 7,2009, NAR and Vermillion stated the terms of their settlement
agreement on the record. (Addendum "1", Partial Trial Transcript, July 7, 2009)
Neither Dr. Baird nor his counsel was informed that the Settlement Agreement
waived, or even related to, Dr. Baird's claims for attorney's fees that were pending
at the time the Settlement Agreement was agreed. Id. The District Court did not
make an inquiry on the record that Dr. Baird understood or agreed that the
Settlement Agreement impacted his rights under Dr. Baird's three pending
motions for attorney's fees. Id. In contrast, the District Court did ask Aubrie
Vermillion and the representative of NAR on the record for their consents to the
Settlement Agreement. Id.
13. On September 30, 2009, after learning the dispute between NAR and Vermillion
had been concluded, Dr. Baird submitted a memorandum in support of his pending
motions for attorney's fees. (R. 484-554)
5
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14. On May 5, 2010 a hearing was held concerning Dr. Baird's motions for attorney's
fees, along with various counter motions filed by Vermillion. (R. 1038)
15. The Court denied Dr. Baird's motions for attorney's fees based upon the District
Court's finding that Dr. Baird was in privity with NAR, and thus bound by the
NAR's and Vermillion's Settlement Agreement. (R. 1041-1043 (Addendum "3"))
16. The Court's July 6, 2010 Order, and November 19, 2010 Final Order,2 rendered
moot, and denied, Dr. Baird's pending motions for attorney fees. (R. 1041-1043
(Addendum "3"); 1075-1077 (Addendum "4"))
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Dr. Baird was not a party to this case, or the Settlement Agreement entered into by
NAR and Vermillion. Dr. Baird's interest in the case was limited to being a witness and
claiming attorney fees against Vermillion and her counsel. Dr. Baird is not in privity
with NAR. As such, the Settlement Agreement is not binding upon Dr. Baird. The
pending motions for attorney's fees filed by Dr. Baird against Vermillion and her
counsel, which had been reserved by the Trial Court on multiple occasions, were thus
incorrectly denied as barred by NAR's and Vermillion's Settlement Agreement.
ARGUMENT
L

DR. BAIRD WAS NOT A PARTY TO THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Unless expressly stated otherwise, settlement agreements are only enforceable

against the parties that executed the agreement. "Settlement agreements are governed by

2

The "Final Order" merely clarifies that the District Court's July 6,2010 Order was its
final order. (R. 1075-1077 (Addendum "4"))
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the rules applied to general contract actions." Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 215 P.3d
933,939 (Utah 2009).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that non-signatory third-parties were not bound
by or subject to a settlement agreement that unambiguously released only the claims
between the parties named in the agreement. Id. at 939-940. In Bodell, there were only
two parties named in the settlement agreement. Id. The settlement agreement
specifically named which parties were released from which claims. Id. There was a
complete lack of language within the settlement agreement indicating that the parties
intended to satisfy all potential tort and contract claims against persons not a party to the
agreement. Id.
Dr. Baird (a non-signatory third party) is not bound by or subject to NAR's and
Vermillion's Settlement Agreement. Dr. Baird was never a party to the lawsuit. Dr.
Baird was not a party to the settlement negotiations and was not a party to any Settlement
Agreement between NAR and Vermillion. Dr. Baird never signed NAR's and
Vermillion's Settlement Agreement. Dr. Baird was merely present at place the settlement
was negotiated because he was designated as a fact witness to testify at the trial. Dr.
Baird never gave his verbal approval of the Settlement Agreement when it was stated into
the record. The District Court did not make an inquiry on the record that Dr. Baird
understood or agreed that the Settlement Agreement impacted his rights under Dr.
Baird's three pending motions for attorney's fees. In contrast, the District Court did ask
Aubrie Vermillion and the representative of NAR on the record for their consents to the
Settlement Agreement. Dr. Baird's counsel never gave his verbal or written approval of
7
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the Settlement Agreement. A copy of the Settlement Agreement was never provided to
Dr. Baird or his counsel. Based on the foregoing, and under Bodell, Dr. Baird is not
bound by or subject to NAR's and Vermillion's Settlement Agreement.
For further support that Dr. Baird was not a party to the Settlement Agreement,
one only has to consider the requirements of Utah Rule Professional Conduct 4.2. Rule
4.2(a) provides: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the
subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another
lawyer in the matter, unless the law7er has the consent of the other lawyer." Utah R.
Prof. C. 4.2(a). Both NAR's and Vermillion's counsel knew that, at all times relevant,
Dr. Baird was represented by counsel different from NAR's counsel. Dr. Baird's counsel
was never made aware that Vermillion was negotiating a settlement with Dr. Baird. The
most likely reason why Dr. Baird's counsel was not so notified, is that counsel knew that
only NAR and Vermillion were subject to the Settlement Agreement. Dr. Baird
reasonably presumes that counsel adhered to their professional duties under Rule 4.2.
Otherwise, the negotiations and settlement would have violated standards of
professionalism and Dr. Baird's right to counsel, which would void the agreement as it
applies to Dr. Baird.
Finally, as a practical matter, it would have made absolutely no sense for Dr. Baird
to concede his pending motions for attorney's fees (in excess of $10,000) against
Vermillion and her counsel, when there were not any counter-claims brought against Dr.
Baird. Dr. Baird's had no exposure at trial and risked nothing. Thus, there was a failure
of consideration for the Settlement Agreement as it applies to Dr. Baird.
8
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II.

DR. BAIRD WAS NOT IN PRIVITY WITH NAR, AND THUS CANNOT
BE INDIRECTLY BOUND BY THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Dr. Baird was not in privity with NAR merely because Dr. Baird was designated

witness and deposed in the matter, nor because Dr. Baird may have benefited from an
outcome favorable to NAR at trial.
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly articulated the law on trial witnesses and
privity:
It is widely held that the sole fact that a person is a witness in an action
does not, by itself, establish privity with any of the parties to that action.
To establish privity, the witness also must have had some control over the
litigation.... That a witness had some interest in the outcome of the case is
immaterial if he lacked control over the trial
Baxter v. UtahDepL Transp., 705 P.2d 1167, 1168-69 (Utah 1985) (emphasis supplied);
see also White Pine Ranches v. Osguthorpe, 731 P,2d 1076, 1077 (Utah 1986) ("privity
cannot be established merely through a witness in a prior proceeding in which the witness
was not a party or did not control a party.") In Baxter, the Supreme Court held that
collateral estoppel could not be invoked because Baxter was not a party to a prior action
concerning the title to certain land adjacent to his own land, even though (1) Baxter was
an expert witness in the prior action, and (2) Baxter would have benefited from a
favorable ruling because it would have validated title to his land. Baxter, 705 P.2d at
1168-69.
Dr. Baird was not in privity with NAR merely because he was a designated
witness and was deposed in preparation for trial. Furthermore, Dr. Baird was not in
privity with NAR because Dr. Baird had absolutely no control over the litigation or the
9
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settlement thereof In the Assignment Agreement between Dr. Baird and NAR (R. 964982, Exhibit B; Addendum "5"), quoted below, Dr. Baird granted NAR the exclusive
right ("full power") to compromise and settle the claim. NAR and its counsel had sole
control over the litigation—Dr. Baird had none. Further, Privity is not established by Dr.
Baird's contractual right to receive a percentage of the amount collected by NAR.
Similar to Baxter, the Settlement Agreement cannot be enforced against Dr. Baird under
a theory of privity merely because Dr, Baird may have received some benefit from a
litigation outcome favorable to NAR. It is clear that Dr. Baird was not in privity with
NAR as it applies to enforceability of the Settlement Agreement against Dr. Baird,
Additionally, privity cannot be established between Dr. Baird and NAR on the
basis that they represent the "same legal right." Searle Bros v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691
(Utah 1978). Dr. Baird's and NAR's legal rights are not the same. Dr. Baird had a legal
right to receive a percentage of money from NAR only if NAR were to collect money
from Vermillion. NAR, as an assignee of the claim, had a legal right to collect from
Vermillion a debt owed. In the Assignment Agreement, Dr. Baird assigned all of his
rights in the debt to NAR, and retained no right to make claims against Vermillion on the
same debt:
[Dr. Baird] hereby transfers, assigns and sets over to NAR, [Dr. Baird's]
claims and demands against all debtors assigned together with all of [Dr.
Baird's] rights, title and interest therein, and the demands represented
thereby, and all rights of action accrued or to accrue, [Dr. Baird] further
grants to NAR . . .full power to collect, compromise, reassign, or in any
other manner enforce the collection thereof.

10
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(R. 964-982, Exhibit B; Addendum "5"). By contract, Dr. Baird had no legal interest in
the action brought by NAR against Vermillion. Furthermore, Vermillion had claims
pending against NAR at the time the settlement was reached. Vermillion had no claims
pending against Dr. Baird. Therefore, NAR's interest in settling its exposure in the case
drastically differed from any interest Dr. Baird has in the outcome of the case. Based on
the foregoing, privity cannot be established based upon Dr. Baird and NAR representing
the "same legal right."
In sum, Dr. Baird was not in privity with NAR by reason of the fact that Dr. Baird
was a trial witness, or may have been benefited by a litigation outcome favorable to
NAR, and it is clear that Dr. Baird and NAR do not share the "same legal right."
CONCLUSION
Dr. Baird does not challenge the public policy favoring enforcement of settlement
agreements. However, the Settlement Agreement at issue cannot be enforced against Dr.
Baird because he is not a party to that agreement and is not in legal privity with NAR.
Even if Dr. Baird was a party to, or was in privity with NAR, the Settlement Agreement
still cannot be enforced against Dr. Baird because the Settlement Agreement would have
been negotiated and agreed upon in violation of Dr. Baird's right to counsel, standards of
professionalism, and for a failure of consideration.
For the foregoing reasons, the final order on appeal should be reversed to the
extent it finds that Dr. Baird's pending motions for attorney's fees were barred by the
terms of the Settlement Agreement, and Dr. Baird's motions for attorney's fees should be
remanded to the District Court for hearing and a decision.
11
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

DATED this 1f\_ day of August, 201.

^t/z^/S
vtt

zfek A. Coulter
Robert T. Tateoka
Attorneys for Appellant Neil B. Baird, D.D.S.
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; TUESDAY, JULY 7, 2009, 2:30 P.M.
-oooOooo[Excerpt of proceedings,]
THE COURT:
seated, please.

Okay.

Everyone go ahead and be

We are back on the record with the jury

present in the jury box.
MR. ADY:

Counsel also present.

I believe we would like to approach,

Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Oh, sure-

Come on up.

{Discussion at bench.)
THE COURT:
very quick issue.

We need to excuse you for one more

It should help.

Okay?

Take them back,

Elaine.
(Whereupon, the jury exited the courtroom.)
THE COURT:

Go ahead and be seated.

We are on the record.
on this, counsel.
MR. ADY:

Let me know where you are

Who would like to speak?
I understand that what wefve got is

plaintiff will pay the defendant $1,000.

The debt will be -

or the claim for the debt will be extinguished and expunged
from Ms. Vermillion's credit reports, all credit reporting
agencies to which the debt has been - the claimed debt has
been reported will be expunged forthwith.

There will be a

confidentiality provision as to the $1,000 only, that
neither party will disclose it to any other third party.
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They can talk about the settlement; they can't talk about
the $1,000,
And that there will be no — it will not be
characterized as a forgiveness of debt, for tax purposes.
There's not going to be any form sent to my client saying
that they've been - I forget the tax number, it escapes me,
of the IRS form.
THE COURT:

It's sort of like a 1099, isn't it?

Or a MR. SCOFIELD:
MR. ADY:

1099.

Yeah, 1099.

be a 1099 sent to them*

There we are.

There won't

And - and we're also going to

release Dr. Baird from any claims as well.
THE COURT:
MR. ADY:

All right.
Is there anything else?

THE COURT:

Is that the agreement, Mr, Scofield?

MR. SCOFIELD:

Let me just clarify my

understanding on the confidentiality of the $1,000 payment.
It's no reference to there being a payment, not necessarily
just the amount.

And the release would be as to NAR, its

officers, agents, Dr. Baird, his officers, agents and both
of their attorneys.
THE COURT:

And, likewise It's meant to be - it's meant to be -

inclusive —
MR. ADY:

Aubrey and Dustin, the other way as
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"1
well,
THE COURT:
MR. ADY:

All claims both ways.
Yeah.

MR. SCOFIELD:

Right,

And then with respect to

clearing up the credit, I don't know that I necessarily
agree with the "forthwith," but I would say THE COURT:

That one struck me.

As soon as you

You wonft get it done forthwith.

reasonably can.

Forthwith

is when they put you in handcuffs and take you through that
door.
MR. ADY:

Right.

THE COURT:

That's forthwith.

MR. SCOFIELD:

Right.

as reasonably practicable.

Well, we'll do is as soon

And I think we should be able to

get a check to them MR. ADY:

I think the language on the credit, if I

may just interpose, NAR does not directly control the
database of credit reporting agencies.
make requests.

All they can do is

Either they're - they're requested, but

there aren't any requests (inaudible).

The language in the

agreement needs to reflect that that is their obligation to
make this request.
MR. SCOFIELD:

Your Honor, the issue is not to

force Experian THE COURT:

But you'll make the request in the -
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in the most effective form you MR. ADY:

Absolutely.

MR. SCOFIELD:

What NAR does, it submits a form

called a UDF or an AUDF, Uniform Data Form, to the credit
furnisher to the credit reporting agency.

And if they send

in - I don't know if they use - I would imagine they're
using Metro 2 and doing the AUDFs,

If you're doing the

Metro 2 format, you simply have to indicate on there that
there is no debt and MR. ADY:

Right.

But they don't have to

(inaudible) occasionally that, but once THE COURT:
MR. ADY:

You're not guaranteed what they do.
Yeah.

Experian's performance.

And we're not going to guarantee
We can only guarantee that NAR will

go through the proper channels, commercially reasonable
channels/ that it will use the same format that they
normally use.

There's no reason — NAR doesn't want this on

their - on Ms. Vermillion1s credit.

They want to comply.

But there's no reason to saddle any obligations THE COURT:

Mr. Saxton seemed to have a concern.

I don't know if they've resolved the point that you're MR. SAXTON:
Mr. Ady, are outdated.

The funds you're referring to/
We don't use those any more.

an electronic submission now.
MR. ADY:

(Inaudible)•
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It's

1

MR. SAXTON:

It's an electronic submission, not

2

necessarily that, but it is an electronic submission.

3

we'll electronically submit it to have it updated.

4
5

MR. ADY:

Okay.

And

And if - and I guess - you know,

my understanding is they can take it off.

You know, if

6 I they - and our position is that if it doesn f t come off,
7

there's not a settlement; is that right?

8 J
9

THE COURT:
road.

Well, I'm not going to go down that

They can only do what they can do.

10

submit, there's not a settlement.

n

of consideration.

12

end...

13
14

That would be a failure

But since they don't control the other

MR. ADY:

Well, that's - that's where the

difference is.

15
16

If they don't

THE COURT:

Then let's bring the jury in.

Because

they can only do what they can do.

17

MR. SCOFIELD:

18

MR. ADY:

Well, and then one thing -

Well, I'm just saying, Chip - Chip, if I

19

call you, you'll help me, right?

20

"Hey, these guys are being butts; will you - will you make a

21

phone call for me?"

22

MR. SAXTON:

If I call you and say,

What I do know - what my experience

23

is, Mr. Ady, I can't direct you as to your - your client

24

directly.

25

of an issue like that, that it's fairly easily cleared up

But my experience is that, if there is some sort
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with the credit reporting agencies.

The person affected

just needs to contact the credit reporting agencies, file a
dispute, the dispute comes back to NAR, and they say, "Hey,
what's going on?"
off."

And they say, "No, take it off.

Take it

And so then it's - it's all done.
MR. SCOFIELD:

I think what we can agree to do is

everything that can be - can be done to notify a credit
reporting agency that there's no debt.
THE COURT:

Well, that's what -

MR. ADY:

I still won't act, then the remedy comes

under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, I think, because
they're reporting a debt that doesn't exist anymore, so MR. SAXTON:
MR. ADY:

And -

Because it's later debt.

And so

you're THE COURT:
MR. ADY:

And you think that's going to happen.

And the reporting cycle's every 30 days.

So you're going to submit it within the next MR. SAXTON:
manually, on demand.
MR. ADY:

We can do it electronically,
So -

Okay.

MR. SAXTON:

- if this happens, I'll call my

office on the way back, tell them to delete it and they'll
electronically submit it to have it deleted.
MR. ADY:

And there's going to be transparency for
8
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us so that we can see what you've done and submitted?
We 1 11 send you -

MR. SCOFIELD:
MR. SAXTON:

We can send - we can send a notice

that says we've done it.
MR. SCOFIELD:
MR. SAXTON:

Whatever we have consented.
Yeah, we can.

We can do that, you

bet*
THE COURT:
MR. ADY:

So do we have an agreement now?
All right.

THE COURT:

Mr, Scofield, anything else you need

to add?
MR. SCOFIELD:

Just when can we get them a check

and how do you want it made out?
MR. ADY:

Just to me in trust.

MR. SCOFIELD:

You in trust for a thousand.

And the only other point would be those are all
the payments; otherwise/ everyone bears their own attorneys
fees, costs and expenses.
THE COURT:

Absolutely.

MR. SCOFIELD:

It's got to be that.

And that's my understanding of the

agreement, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
NAR and (inaudible):

Let me ask Mr. Saxton, as president of
Are you willing to abide by this

agreement as stated, sir?
MR. SAXTON:

Yes, I am.
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THE COURT:

The plaintiff - the party is

Ms. Vermillion, but I'd like to hear from both of you if
you're willing to abide by this.
MR. ADY:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT:
a yes, but I —

Ms• Vermillion, you accept it?

That's

I note — I'm pretty sure no one's happy.

also think you've all done the right thing.

I

And I'm sorry

things had to get to this point,
I'll approve the settlement.

I'll look forward to

concluding documents.
Are you going to draft those, Mr. Scofield?
MR. SCOFIELD:
THE COURT:

I'd be happy to, Your Honor.

Thank you.

May I release the jury?
MR. SCOFIELD:
MR. ADY:
THE COURT:

You may.

You may, sir.
Thank you.

MR. SCOFIELD:

Thank you, Your Honor.

(Whereupon, the hearing was
concluded at 2:39 p.m.)
-000O000-

10
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; WEDNESDAY, MAY 5, 2010, 10:06 A.M.
-OOOOoooTHE COURT:
.

I guess we're all here finally.

We're here on NAR versus Vermillion, 070908175.
Please state appearances.
MR. SCOFIELD:

David Scofield appearing for the

plaintiff, NAR, Inc.
MR. ADY:

Ronald Ady for the defendant, Aubrie

Vermillion.
MR. COULTER:
THE COURT:

Derek Coulter for Dr. Neil Baird.

Okay.

We are here on your motion,

Mr. Ady, correct, the —
MR. COULTER:
MR. ADY:

No, sir.

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

The motion to enforce or the other

one?
MR. COULTER:

The first motion was our motion -

the first motion for the Court today is our motion for
attorneys' fees.

This will take —

THE COURT:

Well, I know that's true, but until I

address the enforcement, I don't think I get to that.
MR. ADY:

In your minute entry for this hearing,

sir, you indicated that you wished to address the
enforcement issue first.
THE COURT:

The settlement —

Then that makes sense to me.
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If I

1

enforce the settlement, there's no attorneys' fee issue in

2

this case.

3

motion for fees.

4

So, yes, I'm addressing the enforcement,

That's why I see it that way.

I know you have a

That's what raised all the other issues.

5

MR. COULTER:

6

THE COURT:

Okay.
Although the number of things you have

7

on the table scares the life out of me.

Let's see if you

8

can - I'm very familiar with the issues, as you know,

9 ! Mr. Ady, but go ahead.
i

10 ;

MR. ADY:

Yes.

11 ;

As the Court noted when we were last before it, if

12 I there hadn't been a comprehensive settlement agreement
j
13 I between everyone interested in this litigation, including
14 i Dr. Baird, the Court would not have proceeded with the
15

settlement.

That was clearly the Court's understanding,

16 j that was defendant's understanding.

And, in fact, the

17 I record before the Court discloses that there was a
18 ; settlement,

19

The transcript of the hearing at page — of the

20 | July 7th, 2009 hearing, at page 4, lines 17 through 22,
21

Mr. Scofield stated, quote:

22

"Let me just clarify my understanding of the

23

$1,000 payment.

24

payment, not necessarily just the amount, and the

25

release would be as to NAR, its officers, agents,

It's no reference to the vENA
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Dr. Baird, his officers, agents, and both of their
attorneys.

Likewise, the — "

And then the Court interjected:
"It's meant to be inclusive.

It's meant to be

inclusive.
And then I said:
"Aubrie and Dustin the other way as well."
And the Court stated:
"All claims both ways."
And so - and then Mr. Scofield, on page 9, stated:
"And the only other point would be those are all
the payments.

Otherwise, everyone bears their own

attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses•"
Now, Dr. Baird was here, but he did not
participate in the colloquy that I just stated and, on that
basis, I believe, challenges this settlement as binding him.
But the Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that when a
privy to a party - that they're privy to a party is bound by
a settlement.

And Dr. Baird was undoubtedly a privy and -

of NAR in this litigation.
The documents attached to our motion disclose that
Dr. Baird retained 50 percent of all monies collected and
applied - well, at least 50 percent and as much as 66 and
6.66 percent of all monies collected throughout this
proceeding.
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From the plaintiff's perspective, thatfs why they
were here was to collect money from the defendant.

That was

the plaintiff's purpose in prosecuting this action.
not a complicated concept.

That's

They were here to collect from

the defendant, Aubrie Vermillion, a dental bill which she
disputed, and Dr. Baird's interest in this action was
exactly the same.

He retained that 50 percent interest - or

up to 66.64 percent interest, somewhere in that range, in
the litigation.

So his interest in this litigation was at

least as large as NAR's, and perhaps he had a greater
interest.
So the question is:
interests in this action?

Did NAR represent Dr. Baird's

And where that - it was that 50

percent to 66.64 percent interest in the alleged debt, the
answer must be "Yes, that's what this case was about."
And not only — NAR not only adequately represented
Dr. Baird, but fully represented him.
Dr. Baird - although it's not required for a privy
to have notice of an action, in this case, Dr. Baird had
notice of the action.
with our subpoena.

On July 20th, 2007, he was served

Right from the get-go, he knew that

subpoena was served shortly after my client filed her answer
in this case.

And so Dr. Baird and his counsel knew that

this action was being prosecuted from the very beginning.
I've cited the cases in our memorandum, making
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clear that, where a party's interests are litigated, where
there's an identity of interest between a party and a privy,
then the privy is bound by any settlement that results.
In particular, I referred the Court to the - I
think it!s the Mahur or Mahar case out of - 1953 case from
the Utah Supreme Court*

It says:

"The terms of an agreement bind a party's privies,
having knowledge thereof."
And then there's a more recent case out of the

District of Utah, Media News Group v. McCarvey,

where the

court applied Utah law but cited to a 10th Circuit decision,
referring to Oklahoma law to hold that:
"The McCarveys are so closely associated with the
signatories to the contracts that they should be
considered privies to the signatories and so bound
by the integration clauses."
And so I don't think there's any reasonable basis
for disputing that Dr. Baird was a privy in this action.
The settlement agreement stated on the record before this
Court on July 7th, 2009 comprehended all claims that could
be brought, including the claims for attorney fees that
Dr. Baird now pursues.
Dr. Baird cites to a number of cases, but as the
Court knows, we distinguished all those in our reply
memorandum.

I don't think any of those cases are apt or on
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point.

And the other remaining argument by Dr. Baird is,

"Well, gee, what we're pursuing here is our claim for
attorneys' fees, and so that brings us outside of the
settlement."
But as we just read, we expressly, on the record —
and Mr. Scofield was careful to make clear that this
settlement resolved all claims for attorney fees, either
way, on both sides, including agents and attorneys.
So it was a comprehensive settlement, Dr. Baird
was the privy of NAR in this action; he's bound by the
settlement, and there's no claim for attorney fees for NAR
to enforce in this action.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Scofield, are you taking a position on either
side on this matter?
MR. SCOFIELD:
this matter, Your Honor.

I take no position on the merits of
If Your Honor has any questions

about my authority at the time the settlement was entered
into, I'd be happy to address those.
THE COURT:
for me.

But -

Well, now you've raised your question

Well, no, is the authority really the issue?

If

Dr. Baird was present, and had he objected - I mean, first,
he was present.

Second, and one of the frustrations, I

think, for any trial judge when he reads an appellate
decision is you realize the appellate court simply cannot be
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in the trial judge's seat; itfs ]ust not the same
experience.
My recollection is crystal clear.

When we were

having that colloquy, the record doesn't show it, but more
than once, I was talking directly to Dr. Baird waiting for
him to say something, thinking, "This cannot possibly be the
end of this because..."

But it was the end of it, in my

view, if he didn't object, because let's talk about the
logic of it.
I could not see the logic of NAR paying a thousand
bucks in a case to a defendant if they're going to be
exposed to thousands in fees.

Where's the logic in that?

We had a jury sitting to be selected.

This was

not just a little hearing with everyone chatting, we were
ready to try the case to a jury.

And I would — I think

that, of Dr. Baird, we would have resolved it or we would
have tried it to the jury.
So I don't know if he had authority specifically
in any way.

I'd like to know that.

MR. COULTER:

I had - and never have had authority

on behalf of Dr. Baird to enter into any agreements, Your
Honor.

What I would say — and I don't really even know the

underlying nature of this particular fee dispute, but to the
extent that there's a fee dispute arising out of the
agreement that NAR was suing under, it's clear to me that
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that fee dispute would have been resolved by my agreement.
THE COURT:

The only fee dispute for fees as

sanctions for discovery undertaken by Mr. Ady against
Dr. Baird personally, if —
MR. COULTER:

Then that — that doesn't affect what

my agreement at the time was, because I only had authority
to enter into an agreement with respect to THE COURT:

Fair enough.

Now, if Dr. Baird thinks

that, somehow, by settling the case, NAR compromised him, I
think it's res judicata issues, but he may have claims
against them, since they were allegedly acting for him.
you, them.

But I don't know that either.

Not

That's between

them.
But this is where you come back to your challenge,
Mr. Coulter, but it's your challenge and you've taken it on.
Why isn't Dr. Baird precluded, as a privy or as a person
present who didn't utter a word of protest at the jury trial
of this matter?

Because let's be clear for the record, if

the case had gone forward to a jury trial, your fee claim
would have been alive and well.
However it played out, it was ancillary to the
issue we would have tried.
"everybody."

But there's a reason I said

There's a reason I said "inclusive."

a reason why everybody, not both, mattered to me.

There's
There's a

reason why I was looking at Dr. Baird, because, frankly, I

10

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

couldn't believe our good fortune that people saw the light
and were moving forward.
weren't here.

And that's the case I saw.

You

So talk to me.

MR. COULTER:

Yeah, I agree that it is ancillary

to the - to the matters that were there.

I talked to - how

about a little bit of procedural history from Dr. Bairdfs
perspective on this?
I talked to Baird — Dr. Baird before the trial,
and he asked me what he should do.

I said, "Don't - don't

speak unless you have a question posed to you."
represented by counsel.

He was not

The Court was aware of that, David

was aware of that, Mr. Ady was aware of that going in.
THE COURT:

But you were the counsel; you were

welcome to be here.
MR. COULTER:
about a $2,000 bill.

I'm not going to — we're talking
My client has already spent over

$12,000 in attorneys' fees to deal with this and process —
THE COURT:
here.

That's a reason you should have been

Your client had something at stake.

You knew it

could have settled.
MR. COULTER:

No.

Your Honor, my client — look at

the - look at the claims that were tried.
claims that were tried?

The only claims that were tried

were between NAR and the Vermillions.
against Dr. Baird.

What were the

There was no claims

And the Court gave Mr. Ady —
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THE COURT:

There was your claim for fees, which

was asserted in this case.

This is the vehicle for your

claim.
MR. COULTER:

That wasn't in the - that wasn't

before the Court for that trial,
THE COURT:

You'd asked - not for the trial, no,

but within the case.

So you had to have a case to assert it

in.
MR. COULTER:

And we - and those - those matters

were reserved by the Court on three different times, and
you — and the Court said, "When this case is finished, you
bring these matters back before the Court."
THE COURT:
"later."

Did I say "finished"?

Or I said

It could have happened a lot of times.

I don't

think I said "finished."
MR. COULTER:

I thought — my understanding was,

when this matter was finished, when the underlying dispute
between NAR and the Vermillions was concluded, to bring THE COURT:

I don't believe I had -

MR. COULTER:
THE COURT:

- this claim.

- I don't have all the volumes here,

but I wrote — in at least one case, it was a written
statement, a - reserved, right?
MR. COULTER:

Correct.

There was three different

times I was instructed to go ahead and address these matters
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at the end.

That was my understanding.

THE COURT;

I know.

But you still have to protect

it until the end because, if they take away the case, what
have we got left?
MR. COULTER:

We have the ancillary procedure

sanction issues that would remain.

If there's no claims

against Dr. Baird at the trial - and there weren't any - the
Court gave Dr. — gave Mr. Ady months to assert an amended
complaint to assert claims against Dr. Baird for the trial.
We had a discussion about this.
THE COURT:

He —

Well, certiary claims are different

from the attorneys1 fee claim.
MR. COULTER:

Yeah.

And there's no attorneys'

fees claims — the only attorneys" fees claims that would
have been at issue at the trial were attorneys' fees claims
between. NAR —
THE COURT:

I disagree.

They didn't have to be at

issue in the trial; they weren't being submitted to the
jury.

But to resolve and compromise the case resolves and

compromises everything within the case and that, even if
it's not true in other cases, it's certainly true in the
case of a privy.

There's no privity here.

Do you disagree with that?
MR. COULTER:
legal privity.

Yeah.

Absolutely.

This is not

Again, we've got —

13
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THE COURT:

Why not?

MR. COULTER:
of-interest thing.

We've got the whole party-

Because the interest of Dr. Baird here

and the interest of NAR are not the same.

This is — okay,

we've got all of these pending motions for sanctions against
Mr. Ady and the Vermillions.
shared by NAR.

None of those interests are

The Court was just able to highlight, these

are ancillary issues.

NAR's not going to participate.

If there is claims that we'd get against NAR - or,
excuse me, against Vermillions or Mr. Ady for these improper
discovery abuses, NAR doesn't share in that.
an interest in a — in a collection account.

NAR only had
Those interests

are not the same; there is not the legal privity.
THE COURT:

But they're asserting Dr. Baird's

interest as against Vermillion initially.
MR. COULTER:

And there's the Baxter case that is

directly on point in that by the Supreme Court.

Just

because he may also benefit from something that NAR does
against a defendant does not mean that they have the exact
same privity interest.
Baxter

And they don't in this case.

The

case is very clear on that.
The other thing that's very clear on this is that

the Supreme Court - in 2009 — and it's Bodell
states very clearly:

v.

Robbins,

"Settlement agreements are only

enforceable against the parties that signed it."
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And if we don't have the privity and the Supreme
Court says that settlement agreements are only enforceable
against the parties, that means NAR and the Vermillions, and
their counsel.

That doesn't affect the rights of a third-

party ancillary claims.

And then we've got two Supreme

Court cases that are - that are directly addressing these
issues.
I don't see how in the world - if we don't have
the exact same privity of interest between NAR THE COURT:

No, it's not exact, I agree,

I think

where we're disagreeing, and very fundamentally, is that
this attorneys' fees claim is for an abuse, really.
MR. COULTER:
THE COURT:

Yeah.
That's your point.

MR. COULTER:
THE COURT:

I mean, things There's abuse within this action which

was an action as to letting your claim for services rendered
by Dr. Baird, rightly or wrongly - and I'm sorry, I do it
every time, Counsel, is it Addy or Ady?
MR. ADY:

Ady.

THE COURT:

I thought so, then he said Addy and

threw me off.
MR. COULTER:
THE COURT:
MR. COULTER:

I'm sorry.
I've lost all confidence in my I'm sorry.

15
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THE COURT:

When you've lived in this country 33

years, not nearly as long in another country, I don't know
which is right anymore.
here.

There are a lot of pronunciations

And I don't like to do that.
Mr. Ady, as common defense of those claims and

alleging all sorts of other issues, which I certainly have
concerns about what he was doing - in fact, I'm looking at
an order right now where I quashed some of these earlier
subpoenas - this was the forum to address that because it's
all connected to the claim for dental services and then his
came back related to collection processes, et cetera, et
cetera*

It was a morass.

beginning.

It's been a morass from the

It's only gotten worse.

Which is all part of

the reason why a settlement had to be across the board.
The payments —
MR. COULTER:
THE COURT:
fees cost.

If I don't -

— everyone bears their own attorneys'

I needed to hear that.

Everyone.

Is everyone

two sides?
MR. COULTER:
THE COURT:

Not both.

MR. COULTER:
THE COURT:

Everyone there was -

It was two sides.

No, it wasn't.

And Dr. Baird -

We had the doctor

sitting there and looking at me, and I'm looking at him and
saying to myself, "There's no way in the world this is
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1

ending if this attorneys' fees isn't over, because that's a

2

b i g g e r case- '•

3

MR. COULTER:

4

THE COURT:

5

It is a bigger c a s e .
It is the bigger case; I agree with

you.

6

MR. COULTER:

7

And Dr. Baird got back to his office

and he - and I asked him, "What happened?"

8

He said, "NAR is just waiving their claims

9 I against" — and here's another very important point.

NAR was

10 | waiving their claims against Vermillions, and NAR paid
11

$1,000.

12

from NAR.

13

the Vermillions and they — they settled their part of the

14

claim.

i
15 !

This $1,000 didn't come from D r . Baird, it came
And he said NAR was waiving their claims against

If I had shown up to that trial when there was no

16 j claims pending against Dr. Baird, would I have even had
17

standing to address this?

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. COULTER:

20

T H E COURT:

21

And the jury —

Heaven's, y e s .
How You would have had standing to stand

u p and say, "Judge, they can't take away my rights to pursue

22 | and ask any issues that you reserved."
i

23
24 :
25

That's exactly what

you could have said to me.
And in one of my orders here where I did quash
someone's discovery, where I said I was concerned that it

17
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was an "improper use of this narrow collection proceeding
for purposes outside of this action, and absent a showing of
direct relevance, I will not permit any such discovery.

I

don't - for the foregoing reasons, I now formally grant the
motion to quash the subpoena, deny defendants motion to
compel," but, later, I gave you some — certain rights that
were tailored to the action.

"...while reserving the issue

of attorneys1 fees and reserving for discussion at the
scheduling conference of the necessity of any further
discovery from Dr. Baird," et cetera.
"Reserving" doesn't say till the end of the case,
although there's plenty of circumstances where the
attorneys' fees should come up at the close of the main
case.

Which —
MR. COULTER:
THE COURT:

In this -

- would have still been fine if we

still had the case and we were here with post-judgment
issues.

But what we had was a compromised dismissal.
MR. COULTER:

Again, it's a party that didn't

agree to it.
THE COURT:
protect yourself.

Well, I know that, but you had to

You know, we could go round and round all

morning, but we can't.
I really see your frustration.

I understand where

you feel differently, but, one, I think there's a privy;

18
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two, he was here and he's apparently instructed not to
speak.

And I don't want to talk this way because I think

you're a very, very fine attorney.
know that.

Not just very fine.

I

I've seen you in many circumstances and I know

your reputation.

Whatever you did, you did for your own

reasons as a lawyer.

But if anyone's going to protect

Dr. Baird in this courtroom on that day, it was you.
But he - if he had even whispered, but,
apparently, he was not supposed to.
MR. COULTER:
THE COURT:

No one asked him a question.
I wouldn't ask him a question because

he was here without his lawyer.

But if he said, "Judge,

wait a minute, I want to hear from my lawyer here," I can
tell you how quickly I would have let him do it.
MR. COULTER:
THE COURT:

Exactly.
I would have had you on the phone.

But you weren't here, it didn't happen, and now I've got a
resolved case as to everybody — quote "everybody."
Look, we disagree and I totally respect your right
to take it up on appeal.

If I'm wrong, I'd love better law

on it.
MR. COULTER:
THE COURT:
wish.

Well, I think we've got -

Well, you've got - you do what you

But, remember, there's more fees involved here.
MR. COULTER:

Well -
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THE COURT:

I don't know if there are.

There's no

fee basis, is there, outside of the sanction?
MR. COULTER:

No.

But we've got - we've got

somebody that's spent $12,000 to deal with things like
telling - telling Dr. Baird that he can't have an attorney
in a deposition.

These are things that the Court can do on

its own initiative.
THE COURT:

But - and this is the American rule.

We do things, sometimes we spend way too much money to
vindicate a right or to stand on a principle.

Sometimes we

get them back, sometimes we don't.
But sometimes, after two or three years of
litigation that is a rathole, we say, "Well, heck, that's
what happens, we all gotta learn from this."

I may think

differently how I do things, I may be more aggressive
earlier.

You did fine in protecting him.

issue there.

You did a fine job with him.

There was no
But that doesn't

change the fact that, when the case was compromised as to
everybody — and this is an ancillary matter, in my view,
that is barred by - for privity, and the Court's absolutely,
necessary apparent power to manage a case and not turn it
into anything worse than it already is.
A lot has been expended and wasted in this case,
as far as I'm concerned.

Throughout.

I was grateful to have an attorney of

20
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Mr. Scofield's ability to come in and get a resolution on
the underlying issue.

But if it hadn't worked, we would

have gone to trial that very day.
people sitting here waiting.

We had about 24 to 28

Short of an objection stated,

I accept the stipulation as stated, I have a doctor sitting
there not objecting; that was my belief, and I will not
reopen it at this time.
I'm granting the motion to enforce the settlement.
And, as I say, I thoroughly respect if you take it up, and
I - I'll look forward to being educated*
MR. COULTER:

I appreciate it.

And not to change

the Court's mind here, but I think, we, as attorneys, when
we start a case and we are starting a case as an advocate of
our client's position, we have a duty not only to adhere to
the Rules of Civil Procedure but also the rules of
professional civility, to implement legal processes that are
efficient, that don't waste an opposing party's time and
waste the Court's time.
Because we've got — we've got 15, 18 motions in
this case on a $2,000 collection action.

And on every

single one of those instances, my - my client's individual
rights were compromised and he had no choice but to go ahead
and spend tens of thousands of dollars on nonsense.
And this isn't a situation where a brand new
lawyer doesn't understand that a deponent has a right to

21
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counsel.

This isn't a situation where, in 2008, an attorney

does not know that he cannot get HIPA requirement documents
on the side.

This — we're not talking about he had an

attorney, we're talking about stuff that is completely
unreasonable.

It violates the Rules of Civil Procedure and

it violated the rules of professional civility-

And we've

got a victim in here who has no faith in the justice system
now because of what he's had to go through.
unfortunate.

And it's

And I - I -

THE COURT:

I totally agree it's unfortunate.

really do, Mr. Coulter.

I

And I wish it had gone another way.

But the justice system can't function, in my view, if the
Court (inaudible) the stipulation in the circumstances we
have here.

And, again, with guidance, I'm happy to see a

different outcome.
MR.*G0tiLTER:
THE COURT:

Thank you, Your Honor,

*

Thank you.

We have Mr. Scofield's pending order of dismissal.
I don't know if it needs to be changed, based on where we
are.

I need an order from you, Mr, Ady, granting your

motion to enforce settlement.

So if you two want to get

together on an order or do two orders.

Or whatf s the

order - the order should be done easily.
MR. SCOFIELD:

We can do that right now.

I could

email you something that is agreeable to us, if you want,
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Your Honor.
THE COURT:

I just want to make sure it's clean

and Mr. Coulter knows where he is on appellate side.
MR. COULTER:

Right.

Dr. Ady won't be signing an

agreement because his rights are compromised.
THE COURT:

Dr. Baird?

MR. COULTER:

And I don't know if he wants to

appeal it or not.
THE COURT:

No.

And that's fine.

But, no, I'm

not expecting him to sign off on an order•
MR. COULTER:

Dr. Baird.

MR. SCOFIELD:

I mean, I don't know if Ron has

looked at my order lately, Your Honor, but it's pretty broad
in the way it's drafted.
THE COURT:

So with his —

He objected, but because of this

pending matter.
MR. SCOFIELD:
THE COURT:

Right.

Why don't you two get together and see

if you can do either a combined order or one each?
MR. ADY:

All right.

THE COURT:

And you can email it to me,

(inaudible) for him to sign it.

And we'll use email.

I'll

make sure we give you an email notification when it's done
so you know when the time runs.
MR. SCOFIELD:

Okay.

Okay.

23
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THE COURT:

I hope to see you all on something

else.
MR. COULTER:
MR. SCOFIELD:

Hopefully, more fun.
I'm sure you'll be seeing us all

some point, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Well, in your case, yes.

Thank you*
MR, ADY:

Thank you, sir.

MR. COULTER:
MR. SCOFIELD:

Thanks, Judge.
Thank you.

(Whereupon, the hearing was
concluded at 10:31 a.m.)
-000O000-
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RONALD ADY, PLLC (USB 3694)
8 East Broadway, Ste. 725
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801)530-3122
(801)746-3501 fax

JUL - 5 2010
SALT LAKE COUNTY
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JL

Deputy Clerk

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

N.A.R., Inc.

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT

Plaintiff,
v.
AUBRIE VERMILLION

Case No. 070908175
Judge Robert 1C. Hilder

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court for hearing on May 5,2010. Defendant was represented
by Ronald Ady, of the law firm of Ronald Ady, PLLC. Dr. Neil Baird was represented by Derek A.
Coulter of the Law Office of Derek A. Couter, P.C
Having considered the papers filed on this motion, and the related motions and process
brought before this Court for its consideration regarding the motion of Dr. Neil Baird for sanctions
against the Defendant Aubrie Vermillion and her legal counsel Ronald Ady, of Ronald Ady, PLLC,
and the cross-motion of the Defendant Aubrie Vermillion for sanctions against Derek A. Coulter,
of Derek A. Coulter, P.C, and having read and considered the terms of the settlement between the
Plaintiff and the Defendant, the Court finding good cause appearing,
ORDERS AND DECREES^ follows
1.

On July 7, 2009 the parties to this" action recited to this Court on the record a

/A
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settlement agreement which by its terms released the PlaintiffN.A.R., Inc, its officers, agents, Dr.
Baird, his officers, agents or their attorneys from any and all claims that could be brought against
them individually or collectivelybythe Defendant, her agents, or her attorneys; and which released
the Defendant Aubrie Vermillion, her agents, and her attorney from any and all claims that could be
brought against them individually or collectively by the Plaintiff N AR, Inc, its officers, agents, Dr.

Baird,

tejmi^v^^p^*^^^
2.

^f^u^A,^

^

Prior to the commencement of this case Dr. Baird had a contractual right to decide o ^

f

^

^

#oa^

whether this litigation would be commenced by the Plaintiff N.A.R., Inc., throughout the ?AaA*~^****&
prosecution of this action Dr. Baird retained an at leastfiftypercent (50%) interest in the res of the
claims prosecuted by the Plaintiff N.A.R., Inc. in this case, and throughout the prosecution of this
case Dr. Baird retained a contractual right to terminate N.A.R., Inc.'s prosecution of the Plaintiffs
claims in this case at any time prior to its conclusion.
3.

Dr. Baird was and is a privy of the Plaintiff N.A.R., Inc. in its prosecution of this case

and as a privy of the Plaintiff N.A.R., Inc. Dr. Baird is bound by the terms of the settlement entered
into by the Plaintiff and Defendant at the trial of this action on July 7,2009.
4.

Dr. Neil Baird was present before the Court during the July 7,2009 trial of this case

and the settlement discussions that occurred at that trial. At that time Dr. Baird did not object to the
settlement of this case or the terms of the settlement.
5.

Although Dr. Baird's claim for legal fees and costs against the Defendant and counsel

for the Defendant was outstanding at the time of the trial of this action, Dr. Baird* s legal counsel was
not present during that trial or the settlement discussions that occurred during the trial.
6.

Upon Dr. Baird's return to his office after the July 7, 2009 settlement of this action

he informed his legal counsel, Derek A. Coulter, that this case had been settled.
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7.

Prior to Dr. Baird's renewing on October 2, 2009 his motion for attorney fees and

costs from the Defendant and counsel for the Defendant, legal counsel for Dr. Baird made no further
inquiry of the Court regarding the terms upon which this case was settled, and made no objection
to the terms of the settlement
8.

Prior to Dr. Baird's renewing on October 2,2009 his motion for attorney fees and

costs from the Defendant and counsel for the Defendant, the monetary consideration required by the
terms of the settlement to be paid by the Plaintiff N.A.R., Inc. to the Defendant was paid.
9.

Dr. Baird, through his legal counsel, has only objected as a matter of law to the

enforcement of the settlement agreement as a bar to Dr. Baird's claim for attorney fees and costs
from the Defendant and her legal counsel, and neither Dr. Baird or his legal counsel have ever
objected to the terais of the settlement agreement entered into in this case on July 7,2009, nor has
Dr. Baird moved to set aside or amend that settlement agreement.
10.

The motion of Dr. Neil Baird for attorney fees as sanctions against the Defendant

Aubrie Vermillion and her attorney Ronald Ady, and the motion by the Defendant Aubrie Vermillion
for attorney fees as sanctions against Derek A. Coulter of the Law Firm of Derek A. Coulter, P.C.,
are each denied as being barred by the terms of the July 7,2009 settlement agreement entered into
and proceeded upon in this case. /")

/
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mm sesTBic? COURT
Third Judicial District

NOV 1 Q 2010
8 A U LAKE COUNTY

Derek A. Coulter (9022)
The Law Office of Derek A. Coulter, P.C.
11576 South State Street, Suite 503
Draper, Utah 84020
Telephone: (801) 501-0321
Facsimile: (801) 307-0318

Qfi

Deputy Clerk

Attorneyfor Neil B. Baird, D.D.S.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

NA.R., Inc.,
FINAL ORDER
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 070908175
AUBRIE VERMILLION,
Judge Robert Hilder
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court for hearing on May 5,2010. Defendant was represented
by Ronald Ady, of the lawfirmof Ronald Ady, PLLC. Plaintiff was represented by David W. Scofieid
of Peters Scofieid, P.C. Dr. Neil Baird was represented by Derek A. Coulter of the Law Office of
Derek A. Coulter, P.C.
The Court's Order signed on July 6, 2010 was the final Order disposing of all causes of
action between all parties. See Exhibit A, Order on Defendant's Motion to Enforce Settlement
Agreement.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

WHEREFORE THE COURT ORDERS:
1.

Dr. Baird was in privity of contract with its representative, Plaintiff N M , Inc. in its

prosecution of this collection action, and as a result, Dr. Baird is bound by the terms of the Settlement
Agreement entered into by the Plaintiff and Defendant at the trial on July 7,2009.
2.

Dr. Baird's Motion(s) for attorney fees against the Defendant Aubrie Vermillion and

her attorney Ronald Ady are barred by the July 7, 2009 Settlement Agreement. Defendant Aubrie
Vermillion's Motion for attorney fees as sanctions against Derek A. Coulter of the Law Firm of
Derek A. Coulter, P.C. is denied based on Defendant's position that all claims were resolved in the
July 7,2009 Settlement Agreement, and therefore no "active" case is available to seek such relief.
3.

This is the FINAL ORDER in this case.

DATED this / ? "day of November, 2010.

Th^rta. Robert]
Third District Court Judge

2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
^w

/vWt-vls**-

I certify that on the ( p ^ d a y ofJune, 20101 caused a true copy of the above referenced
proposed Order to be deposited in the United States Mail, postage pre-paid and addressed to:
David W. Scofield
Suite 115 Parleys Corp. Center
2455 East Parleys Way
Salt Lake City UT 84109
Ronald Ady.PLLC
8 East Broadway, Suite 725
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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RONALD ADY, PLLC (USB 3694)
8 East Broadway, Ste. 725
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Third Judicial District

JUL " 5 2010
SALT LAKE COUNTY
^p
Deputy Clerk

Bjf.

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

N.A.R., Inc.

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT

Plaintiff,
v.
AUBRIE VERMILLION

Case No. 070908175
Judge Robert K. Hilder

Defendant.
-
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This matter came before the Court for hearing on May 5, 2010. Defendant was represented
by Ronald Ady, of the law firm of Ronald Ady, PLLC. Dr. Neil Baird was represented by Derek A.
Coulter of the Law Office of Derek A. Couter, P.C.
Having considered the papers filed on this motion, and the related motions and process
brought before this Court for its consideration regarding the motion of Dr. Neil Baird for sanctions
against the Defendant Aubrie Vermillion and her legal counsel Ronald Ady, of Ronald Ady, PLLC,
and the cross-motion of the Defendant Aubrie Vermillion for sanctions against Derek A. Coulter,
of Derek A. Coulter, P.C, and having read and considered the terms of the settlement between the
Plaintiff and the Defendant, the Court finding good cause appearing,
X

M*.

ORDERS AND DECREES, as follows:

^<V /
1.

/

-

On July 7, 2009, the parties to this action recited to this Court on the record a
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settlement agreement which by its terms released the Plaintiff N.A.R., Inc, its officers, agents, Dr.
Baird, his officers, agents or their attorneys from any and all claims that could be brought against
them individually or collectively by the Defendant, her agents, or her attorneys; and which released
the Defendant Aubrie Vermillion, her agents, and her attorneyfromany and all claims that could be
brought against them individually or collectively by the Plaintiff N AR, Inc, its officers, agents, Dr.

2.

Prior to the commencement of this case Dr. Baird had a contractual right to decide G U #oa^
42*4*44**4 *C-

whether this litigation would be commenced by the Plaintiff N.A.R., Inc., throughout the
prosecution of this action Dr. Baird retained an at leastfiftypercent (50%) interest in the res of the
claims prosecuted by the Plaintiff N.A.R., Inc. in this case, and throughout the prosecution of this
case Dr. Baird retained a contractualrightto terminate N.A.R., Inc.'s prosecution of the Plaintiffs
claims in this case at any time prior to its conclusion.
3.

Dr. Baird was and is aprivy of the Plaintiff N.A.R., Inc. in its prosecution of this case

and as a privy of the Plaintiff N.A.R., Inc. Dr. Baird is bound by the terms of the settlement entered
into by the Plaintiff and Defendant at the trial of this action on July 7, 2009.
4.

Dr. Neil Baird was present before the Court during the July 7,2009 trial of this case

and the settlement discussions that occurred at that trial. At that time Dr. Baird did not object to the
settlement of this case or the terms of the settlement.
5.

Although Dr. Baird's claim for legal fees and costs against the Defendant and counsel

for the Defendant was outstanding at the time of the trial of this action, Dr. Baird1 s legal counsel was
not present during that trial or the settlement discussions that occurred during the trial.
6.

Upon Dr. Baird's return to his office after the July 7, 2009 settlement of this action

he informed his legal counsel, Derek A. Coulter, that this case had been settled.
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7.

Prior to Dr. Baird*s renewing on October 2, 2009 his motion for attorney fees and

costsfromthe Defendant and counsel for the Defendant, legal counsel for Dr. Baird made no further
inquiry of the Court regarding the terms upon which this case was settled, and made no objection
to the terms of the settlement.
8.

Prior to Dr. Baird's renewing on October 2,2009 his motion for attorney fees and

costsfromthe Defendant and counsel for the Defendant, the monetary consideration required by the
terms of the settlement to be paid by the Plaintiff N.A.R., Inc. to the Defendant was paid.
9.

Dr. Baird, through his legal counsel, has only objected as a matter of law to the

enforcement of the settlement agreement as a bar to Dr. Baird's claim for attorney fees and costs
from the Defendant and her legal counsel, and neither Dr. Baird or his legal counsel have ever
objected to the terms of the settlement agreement entered into in this case on July 7, 2009, nor has
Dr. Baird moved to set aside or amend that settlement agreement.
10.

The motion of Dr. Neil Baird for attorney fees as sanctions against the Defendant

Aubrie Vermillion and her attorney Ronald Ady, and the motion by the Defendant Aubrie Vermillion
for attorney fees as sanctions against Derek A. Coulter of the Law Firm of Derek A. Coulter, P.C.,
are each denied as being barred by the terms of the July 7,2009 settlement agreement entered into
and proceeded upon in this case. /"]

.
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NORTH AMERICAN RECOVERY
10 W O T BROADWAY, SUITE 610 • SALT L A X B O T Y , UTAH 8410! TtLEWONE: (801) 364-0777 • TOU FREE: M0O-364-S445 • FAX: (801) 1*4-0784

ASSIGNMENT AGREEMENT
This Agreement dated & £ C / 3 zcob
, between NAR., Inc. (North
American Recovery), hereafter referred to as Agency, and
^i HesI «4 &>AtYd
ft.D.-s.
hereafter referred to as Client. NAR
and Client are sometimes referred to as the "Parties" or a "Party" as the context may require.
NAR is in the business of collecting past due accounts, and desires to assist Client in collecting
past due accounts; and Gient desires that NAR assist Client in collecting past due accounts.
NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged, the Parties agree as follows:
1. Client agrees to periodically assign, at its sole discretion, accounts to NAR for the purpose
of collection. Accordingly, Client hereby transfers, assigns and sets over to NAR, Client's
claims and demands against all debtors assigned together with all of Client's rights, tide and
interest therein, and the demands represented thereby, and all rights of action accrued or to
accrue. Client further grants to NAR, subject to the limitations contained herein, full power to
collect, compromise, reassign, or in any other manner enforce the collection thereof.
2. Assignments shall be made by forwarding collection accounts to NAR. Each time NAR
receives accounts from Client, NAR will send Client an Acknowledgment Report Appearance of
an account on the Acknowledgment Report or appearance of the account on a Statement or
Status Report shall evidence that the account has been validly assigned ("Assigned Account")
pursuant to the terms of this Agreement
3. Client represents and warrants that each Assigned Account represents a legal and lawful
debt which is in fact due and owingtoClient Client further represents and warrants that,
with respect to each Assigned Account, all amounts which Client has sought to recover on any
such account and all amounts which Client represents to NAR are due and owing at the time
the account is assigned to NAR, are in fact legally and lawfully owed to Client pursuant to the
agreement between Client and the person(s) owing the debt, and/or pursuant to applicable
law.
4. NAR will indemnify and hold harmless Client from and against any and all claims,
counterclaims, liabilities or demands arising from errors, omissions, or any unlawful acts by
NAR ("NAR Caused Claims"). NAR further agrees to defend Client against any and all NAR
Caused Claims. NAR shall be entitled to select counsel of its own choosingtodefend Client
against any and all NAR Caused Claims. Notwithstanding NAR's right to select counsel under
this paragraph, Client shall have the right to reject the counsel chosen by NAR, and to retain
counsel of Client's choosing to defend Gient against any NAR Caused Claims. However, in the
event Client, for any reason, rejects the counsel selected by NAR, and/or in the event Client
selects counsel other than the counsel chosen by NAR, to defend Client against any NAR
Caused Claims, NAR will be relieved of any, and will have no further obligation to indemnify,
hold harmless or defend Client from and against any and ail NAR Caused Claims.
5. Client will indemnify and hold harmless NAR and its owners, members, shareholders,
officers, directors, employees, attorneys or other agents (collectively referred to as "NAR
Parties") from and against any and all daims, liabilities or demands arising from errors,
omissions, or any unlawful acts by Client and/or Client's employees, Independent contractors
or agents (the "Client Parties"), or arising from the falsity or breach of
i
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any of Clients representations or warranties. In the event any person(s) from whom NAR
seeks to collect on an Assigned Account asserts any claims, counterclaims, liabilities or
demands against NAR or the NAR Parties based on the conduct of Client and/or the Client
Parties f Client Caused Claims"), Client agrees to indemnify and hold NAR and the NAR Parties
harmless from, and agrees to defend NAR and the NAR Parties against, any and all such Client
Caused Claims. NAR and the NAR Parties shall be entitled to select counsel of their own
choosing to defend against any such Client Caused Claims, and Client agrees to pay the costs,
fees and expenses Incurred by NAR and/or the NAR Parties in connection with defending
against any such Claim,
6. Client authorizes NAR to endorse for deposit, and collect such negotiable instruments as
NAR may receive that are made payable to Client In the event Client receives payment from a
debtor on an Assigned Account, Client shall, within 48 hours of the receipt of any such
payment, notify NAR of all such payments in order to comply with the Fair Debt Collections
Practices Act or other applicable law.
7. NAR will provide Client with a monthly Status Report on or about the 15th of each calendar
month. This report will list all active accounts, the current balance, and the most recent
collection notes made while attempting to collect the account All monies due Client from NAR
will be paid to Client by the 15th of each month following the month collected. In the event
NAR makes a payment to Client based upon a check received from, or on behalf of, a debtor,
and in the event the check that resulted in the payment from NAR to Client is returned unpaid
to NAR, Client agrees to reimburse NAR the amount of money received by Client and which is
derived from or attributable to any such returned check.
8. NAR shall use its best efforts to attempt to collect, without legal action, each Assigned
Account In the event NAR's efforts to collect an Assigned Account without legal action are
not successful, and if NAR determines legal action is required to collect an Assigned Account,
NAR may commence legal action to collect such an Assigned Account. Accordingly, before
commencing any legal action to collect an Assigned Account, NAR shall provide Client with
notification of NAR's decision to commence legal action. Upon receipt of such notification
Client shall promptly notify NAR if Client does not desiretocommence legal action. In the
event Client does not promptly notif/ NAR after receipt of notice from NAR that NAR intends
to commence legal action, Client shall be deemed to have authorized NAR to commence legal
action, and NAR may then commence such legal action as NAR deems appropriate. In the
event Client notifies NAR that Client does not want NARtocommence legal action, NAR will
not commence legal action but NAR may, and NAR's discretion, continue other efforts to
collect the Assigned Account.
9. NAR shall not enter into any agreement for the reduction, settlement or compromise of an
Assigned Account without prior approval from Client
10. Client will not be billed for attorneys fees, court costs, process service fees, commissions
or any other amounts unless an Assigned Account is withdrawn, canceled or settled by Client
after it has been validly assigned. In the event Client withdraws an Assigned Account at any
time, Client will reimburse NAR for all attorneys fees, court costs, process service fees and
other costs and expenses incurred by NAR in connection with attempting to collect on the
withdrawn account. Client will also pay NAR a commission at the applicable commission rate
setforthin
2
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the Commission Schedule below. Client shall be obligated to pay NAR said commission
regardless of whether NAR or Client has collected or otherwise received any money or
payment from the debtor in connection with the withdrawn account; and Client shall pay to
NAR all monies due under this paragraph within thirty (30) days after notifying NAR that an
account is being withdrawn by Client.
11. All payments received by NAR and/or Client will be applied in the following order: court
costs, service of process fees and other costs and expenses associated with commencing and
pursuing legal actionr attorneys fees, damages, interest, and principal balance. NAR shall be
entitled to retain and/or receive all attorneys fees, court costs, service of process fees and
other costs and expenses associated with commencing and pursuing legal action, interest,
and/or damages collected by NAR and/or Client while an account is assigned to NAR.
12. Either Party may terminate this Agreement by providing sixty (60) days advance written
notice to the other Party, Upon termination of the Agreement, Client shall have the option to
(a) leave all Assigned Accounts with NAR, which NAR shall continue to attempt to collect under
the terms of ttiis Agreement, or (b) withdraw all Assigned Accounts and pay NAR the
commissions on such withdrawn accounts at the corresponding commission rate at the time of
such termination, together with all costs, expenses and attorneys fees incurred in connection
with the withdrawn accounts.

/...>
V :'

13. NAR shall have the absolute right to reject or otherwise refuse to accept the assignment
of any account and/or cancel back to Client any Assigned Account In the event NAR cancels
an account back to Client, NAR shall provide written notice to Client that an Assigned Account
is being canceled. The cancellation of any Assigned Account by NAR to Client, regardless of
whether such reassignment is done voluntarily by NAR or at the request of Client, shall not
relieve either NAR or Client of any other obligations they may have under this Agreement,
including without limitation, the obligations relating to indemnification and duty to defend. In
the event any Assigned Account is canceled back to Client for any reason, NAR shall be
entitled to retain all monies relating to said account which NAR may have collected or may
have been paid under this Agreement at time of the cancellation.
14. In the event of a dispute over or relatingtothe terms of this Agreement or any Parly's
performance under this Agreement, the prevailing party in any proceeding brought in
connection with the dispute shall be entitled to recover from the other party its costs,
including reasonable attorneys fees, whether incurred in litigation or otherwise.
15. The Parties agree and acknowledge that this Agreement constitutes the entire agreement
between the Parties, and that this Agreement supersedes and replaces all prior negotiations,
proposed agreements, agreements or representations, whether written or oral, between the
Parties. This agreement also covers every Assigned Account regardless of when the account
was assigned. The Parties agree that their relationship is contractual only, and that nothing in
this Agreement shall be interpreted or construed to create a fidudary relationship between the
Parties. The Parties expressly acknowledge and agree that NAR is not, and shall not be
:
deemed to be, acting as a fiduciary for and on behalf of Client.
16. Any written notices to Client under this Agreement shall be provided to Client at the
address and facsimile number set forth below. Any written notices to NAR under this
Agreement shall be provided to NAR at the address and facsimile number listed below.
3
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COMMISSION RATE SCHEDULE
A.

DEFINITIONS

i.

Assigned Amount; the original amount assigned to NAR for collection as listed on the
Acknowledgment Report,
Regular Account: any Assigned Account with respect to which legal action has not
been commenced, and which has not been forwarded to an out of state agency for
collection,
Other Account: any Assigned Account (a) with respect to which legal action has been
initiated, (b) which has beenforwardedby NAR to an out of state agency for collection,
or (c) which is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding involving a debtor.

ii.
iii.

coMnre?iQN RATES

B.
i.
ii.

Regular Accounts: 33.34% of all monies collected and applied to the Assigned Amount
Other Accounts: 50.00% of all monies collected and applied to the Assigned
Amount

* Ne/'( 6. &d.{rd

S-D.s.

Company Name (Client)
M

v

5 ? ) it?- 10&G6
Address

Sfl-H-Ctt/ i UT

5.

?fo>7£-

* City State Zip

v

75rtt'l/a.£es

PiVw.wfua.1 fW>rdM(x+or

Contact name and dtle
V Phone #: Sot - &nb - «? 7«?£T

v Fax #:

&>l- 6^-^lX.

N.A.R., Inc.
Attn: David J. Saxton
10 West Broadway, Suite 610

yt%u yUteZuJ
v

Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Facsimile No. (801) 364-0784

Authorized Client Signature

Tdtit
hfft££$
&***&&
^ Please print name and title here

OxrcLha.ii>r
Signature for N.A.R., Inc.

PROFESSIONAL DEBT COLLECTION SERVICES • WWW.NORTH-AWERJCAN-RECOVERY.COM
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Supreme Court of Utah.
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Mark H. ROBB1NS; Cherokee & Walker Investment Company, LLC; Cherokee & Walker, LLC;
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Successor to Bank
One, N.A.; and Does I through 50, Defendants and
Appellees.
No. 20070951.
Aug. 4,2009.

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(8) k. Review where evidence consists of documents. Most Cited Cases
The Supreme Court reviews a district court's
interpretation of a contract for correctness, giving
no deference to the district court.
|2| Appeal and Error 30 €=>842(8)

Background: Secondary lender, which had entered
into settlement agreement with primary lender after
primary lender defaulted on repayment obligation
to secondary lender, brought action against borrower and bank for fraud, civil conspiracy, negligent
misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. The District Court, Third District, Salt Lake, Boh ling, J.,
denied borrower's and bank's motion for summary
judgment, but, after case was reassigned, the District Court, John Paul Kennedy, J., granted renewed
summary judgment motion, and secondary lender
appealed.
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Dun-ant, Associate
C.J., held that:
(1) settlement agreement was not an accord and satisfaction which released borrower and bank from
secondary lender's claims;
(2) issue of whether trial court erred in striking expert report was ripe for appeal; and
(3) expert report, which contained three new damages theories not disclosed during discovery, was
inadmissible.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
West Headnotes
111 Appeal and Error 30 C=>842(8)

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVi(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Arc of Law or of Fact
30k842(8) k. Review where evidence consists of documents. Most Cited Cases
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question
of law reviewed for correctness.
|3| Appeal and Error 30 €=>934(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XV1(G) Presumptions
30k934 Judgment
30k934(l) k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
Supreme Court reviews a district court's decision to grant summary judgment for correctness,
granting no deference to the district court's conclusions, and views the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.
|4| Appeal and Error 30 €=>96I
30 Appeal and Error
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30XVI Review
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court
30k961 k. Depositions, affidavits, or discovery. Most Cited Cases
The Supreme Court reviews discovery sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard.

89k 1 Nature and Requisites
89k2 k. in general. Most Cited Cases
Settlement agreements are governed by the
rules applied to general contract actions.

| 5 | Accord and Satisfaction 8 €=>11(2)

89 Compromise and Settlement
891 In General
89k 10 Construction of Agreement
89k 11 k. In general. Most Cited Cases

8 Accord and Satisfaction
8k6 Part Payment
8k 11 Conditioned on Acceptance as Payment
in Full
8k 11(2) k. Remittances on condition.
Most Cited Cases
Compromise and Settlement 89 <C=>11
89 Compromise and Settlement
891 In General
89k 10 Construction of Agreement
89kl 1 k. In general. Most Cited Cases
Settlement agreement between
secondary
lender and primary lender, which then lent funds to
borrower, was not an accord and satisfaction which
released borrower and bank from secondary lender's
claims after borrower defaulted on loan from
primary lender, which then defaulted on loan from
secondary lender, but rather was a settlement agreement which only released claims between secondary lender and primary lender, despite use of term
"satisfied" in agreement,, which incorporated the offer of a payment by primary lender and the acceptance by secondary lender in satisfaction of an obligation; agreement's plain language limited the effect of the payment to the settlement of the claims
between primary lender and secondary lender and
did not contemplate claims as to third parties, and
impact of the term "satisfied" was limited to
primary lender's obligations in connection with loans.
|6| Compromise and Settlement 89 <Q^>2
89 Compromise and Settlement
891 In General

|7| Compromise and Settlement 89 € = ? ! 1

Contracts 95 €=>147(2)
95 Contracts
9511 Construction and Operation
9511(A) General Rules of Construction
95k 147 Intention of Parties
95kl47(2) k. Language of contract.
Most Cited Cases
When interpreting a contract or a settlement
agreement, the court determines the intent of the
contracting parties by first looking to the writing
alone.
|8| Contracts 95 €>==>147(2)
95 Contracts
9511 Construction and Operation
9511(A) General Rules of Construction
95k 147 Intention of Parties
95kl47(2) k. Language of contract.
Most Cited Cases
If the writing is unambiguous, the court determines the intent of the parties exclusively from
the plain meaning of the contractual language.
|9] Evidence 157 € = > 4 4 8
157 Evidence
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting
Writings
157XI(D) Construction or Application of
Language of Written Instrument
I57k448 k. Grounds for admission of extrinsic evidence. Most Cited Cases
Only where there is ambiguity in the terms of
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the contract may the court ascertain the parties' intent from extrinsic evidence.
1101 Contracts 95 €=^143(2)
95 Contracts
9511 Construction and Operation
9511(A) General Rules of Construction
95k 143 Application to Contracts in General
95k 143(2) k. Existence of ambiguity.
Most Cited Cases
A contractual term or provision is ambiguous if
it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies.
1111 Accord and Satisfaction 8 <£^=>1
8 Accord and Satisfaction
8k I k. Nature and requisites in general. Most
Cited Cases
Accord and satisfaction is a common law
concept.
|12| Accord and Satisfaction 8 € = > !
8 Accord and Satisfaction
8k 1 k. Nature and requisites in general. Most
Cited Cases
Accord and satisfaction denotes the intention of
the contracting parties to agree that a different performance, to be made in substitution of the performance originally agreed upon, will discharge the
obligation created under the original agreement.
113] Accord and Satisfaction 8 < € ^ 1
8 Accord and Satisfaction
8k 1 k. Nature and requisites in general. Most
Cited Cases
An accord and satisfaction may discharge an
obligation arising out of a contract, quasi-contract,
or tort.
114| Accord and Satisfaction 8 <C=>23

© 2011 Thomson Reuters.

8 Accord and Satisfaction
8k23 k. Operation and effect of satisfaction.
Most Cited Cases
When a claim is discharged through an accord
and satisfaction, the claim is considered fully satisfied; the claimant no longer has the legal right to
seek recovery from anyone on that claim.
|15| Accord and Satisfaction 8 € = > !
8 Accord and Satisfaction
8k 1 k. Nature and requisites in general. Most
Cited Cases
Before determining that an agreement constitutes an accord and satisfaction, the court must find
the following three elements in the contract: (1) an
unliquidated claim or a bona fide dispute over the
amount due, (2) a payment offered as full settlement of the entire dispute, and (3) an acceptance of
the payment as full settlement of the dispute.
[16| Appeal and Error 30 € ^ 8 5 6 ( 1 )
30 Appeal and Error
30XV1 Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k851 Theory and Grounds of Decision
of Lower Court
30k856 Grounds for Sustaining Decision Not Considered
30k856(l) k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
Supreme Court, which reversed grant of summary judgment to borrower and bank on grounds
that settlement agreement between lenders was not
an accord and satisfaction which released lender's
claims against borrower and bank, would decline to
affirm summary judgment on any of seven other
theories presented to but not reached by the district
court, as doing so would serve judicial economy;
district court was already familiar with the alternative theories as they had been fully briefed and argued to that court, and thus was in a better position
than the Supreme Court to rule on the alternative
theories.
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|17| Appeal and Error 30 €=>852
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k851 Theory and Grounds of Decision
of Lower Court
30k852 k. Scope and theory of case.
Most Cited Cases
Appeal and Error 30 €=>856(t)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k851 Theory and Grounds of Decision
of Lower Court
30k856 Grounds for Sustaining Decision Not Considered
30k856(l) k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
To serve judicial economy, the Supreme Court
may affirm a district court's decision whenever the
decision appealed from is sustainable on any legal
ground or theory apparent on the record.
|18| Appeal and Error 30 C=>18
30 Appeal and Error
3011 Nature and Grounds of Appellate Jurisdiction
30kl8 k. Grounds and extent in general.
Most Cited Cases
A dispute is ripe for appeal when a conflict
over the application of a legal provision has
sharpened into an actual or imminent clash of legal
rights and obligations between the parties thereto.
|19| Appeal and Error 30 €=> 18
30 Appeal and Error
3011 Nature and Grounds of Appellate Jurisdiction
30k 18 k. Grounds and extent in general.
Most Cited Cases

An issue is not ripe for appeal if there exists no
more than a difference of opinion regarding the hypothetical application of a provision to a situation
in which the parties might, at some future time, find
themselves.
|20| Appeal and Error 30 € = > 169
30 Appeal and Error
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower
Court of Grounds of Review
30V(A) Issues and Questions in Lower Court
30k 169 k. Necessity of presentation in
general. Most Cited Cases
If an issue was raised, argued, and resolved by
the trial court prior to the entry of a final judgment,
then that issue is ripe for appeal, and the failure to
raise it on appeal results in a waiver of the right to
raise it at a later time.
[211 Appeal and Error 30 C=>242(4)
30 Appeal and Error
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower
Court of Grounds of Review
30V(B) Objections and Motions, and Rulings
Thereon
30k242 Necessity of Ruling on Objection
or Motion
30k242(4) k. Rulings on evidence in
general. Most Cited Cases
Issue of whether trial court erred in striking expert report was ripe for appeal, although it was possible, in light of Supreme Court's reversal of summary judgment, that case could be later decided or
settled on remand on issues unrelated to the information in the report, where issue had been squarely
presented to the district court, the court had ruled
on the issue, the issue was ripe when the court ruled
on it, and the court had issued a final judgment.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 37(0.
|22) Pretrial Procedure 307A €==>45
3 07A Pretrial Procedure
307AII Depositions and Discovery
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307A 11(A) Discovery in General
307Ak44 Failure to Disclose; Sanctions
307Ak45 k. Facts taken as established
or denial precluded; preclusion of evidence or witness. Most Cited Cases
Expert report which contained three new damages theories not disclosed during discovery was inadmissible in secondary lender's action against borrower and bank for unjust enrichment, fraud, and
other tort claims; secondary lender disclosed during
initial discovery period that its damages "constitute
the ftmds advanced, together with interest at the
legal rate, less the payment received" from primary
lender and clarified in response to request for admission that he sought interest at the legal rate as
provided by statute, report included three new damages theories, including the benefit of the bargain
rule, the modified benefit of the bargain rule, and
the comparable rate of return theory, secondary
lender's citation to statute was insufficient to constitute disclosure of the "computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party,"
and borrower and bank were prejudiced by the late
disclosure due to their inability to discover asserted
essential facts such at secondary lender's loan history and ability to lend money to others in lieu of
loan which ultimately went to borrower. West's
U.C.A. §§ 15-1-1, 15-1-4; Rules Civ.Proc, Rules
26, 37(0.
(231 Pretrial Procedure 307A <&=?44.1
307A Pretrial Procedure
307A1I Depositions and Discovery
307AII(A) Discovery in General
307Ak44 Failure to Disclose; Sanctions
307Ak44.1 k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
When a party fails to make timely discovery
disclosure, the district court is required to impose
discovery sanctions on that party unless the failure
to disclose is harmless or the party shows good
cause for the failure to disclose. Rules Civ.Proc,
Rules 26,37(0.

307A Pretrial Procedure
307A1I Depositions and Discovery
307AII(A) Discovery in General
307Ak44 Failure to Disclose; Sanctions
307Ak44.1 k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
The district court has broad discretion regarding the imposition of discovery sanctions. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 37.
|2S| Appeal and Error 30 € = > 9 6 l
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court
30k96l k. Depositions, affidavits, or discovery. Most Cited Cases
In applying the abuse of discretion standard to
the district court's imposition of a particular sanction for a discovery violation, the Supreme Court
gives the district court a great deal of latitude in determining the most fair and efficient manner to conduct court business, because the district court judge
is in the best position to evaluate the status of his or
her cases, as well as the attitudes, motives, and
credibility of the parties. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 37.
[26) Appeal and Error 30 €=>961
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court
30k961 k. Depositions, affidavits, or discovery. Most Cited Cases
The Supreme Court will determine that a district court has abused its discretion in choosing
which discovery sanction to impose only if there is
either an erroneous conclusion of law or no evidentiary basis for the district court's ruling. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 37.
*936 James S. Jardine, Matthew R. Lewis, Erin
Bergeson Hull, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff Andrew
G. Deiss, Billie J. Siddoway, Salt Lake City, for defendant Mark H. Robbins.

|24| Pretrial Procedure 307A ©=>44.1

© 2011 Thomson Reuters.

Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

httD://web2.westlaw.com/Drint/Drintstream.asDx?mt=Westlaw&orft=HTMLE<fcvr=2.0&des

.

8/26/20 11

Page7ofl6
Page 6
215 P.3d 933,636 Utah Adv. Rep. 3,2009 UT 52
(Cite as: 215 P.3d 933)

John A. Beckstead, H. Douglas Owens, Romaine C.
Marshall, Salt Lake City, for defendant JPMorgan
Chase Bank.

DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice:
INTRODUCTION
U 1 In this case, we must determine the scope
of a settlement agreement between Michael Bodell
and his company Bodell Construction Company
(collectively, "Bodell"), on the one hand, and Marc
Jenson and his company
MSF
Properties
(collectively, "Jenson"), on the other. More specifically, we must determine whether Bodell and
Jenson intended their settlement agreement to settle
only the claims between themselves or whether
they intended the settlement agreement to also
settle related claims involving third parties, specifically Bank One and Mark Robbins.
H 2 Bank One and Robbins argued before the
district court that the settlement agreement between
Bodell and Jenson was an "accord and satisfaction," meaning that the agreement was not limited
to the claims between Bodell and Jenson but satisfied all related claims even those with third parties.
On this basis, Bank One and Robbins moved for
summary judgment regarding claims that Bodell asserted against them. In response, Bodell argued that
the agreement was not an accord and satisfaction
but rather a "release," meaning thai the agreement
only released the named parties from the claims
that they had against one another. The district court
granted the summary judgment motion filed by
Bank One and Robbins.
f 3 On appeal, Bodell asserts that the district
court erred when it (1) granted summary judgment
on the ground that the settlement agreement was
unambiguously an accord and satisfaction and (2)
struck the report of Bodell's damages expert.
H 4 Because we determine that the language of
the settlement agreement unambiguously demonstrates that Bodell and Jenson intended the agreement to release only the claims they had against one

© 2011 Thomson Reuters.

another, not any third-party claims, we reverse the
district court's grant of summary judgment. But we
affirm the district court's decision to strike the report of Bodell's damages expert because we conclude that striking the report was within the district
court's discretion.

BACKGROUND
K 5 For purposes of the summary judgment motion, the parties did not dispute the following material facts. In January 2000, Robbins sold a 50 percent interest in his bicycle companies (collectively,
"Vtrax") to Cherokee & Walker ("C & W"). Within
weeks of this transaction, Robbins and C & W became dissatisfied with the business relationship. In
May 2000, the parties agreed that Robbins would
repurchase C & W's interest in Vtrax for $8 million.
But Robbins *937 did not have $8 million. Consequently, Robbins missed several payment deadlines over the next few months. The directors of C
& W grew impatient and threatened to seize control
of Vtrax.
U 6 Robbins did not want to lose control of
Vtrax, so he continued his search for a lender. During this search, Robbins became aware of the opportunity to acquire the popular "Mongoose" bicycle brand. Robbins knew he needed complete
control over Vtrax in order to pursue the Mongoose
acquisition. At this point, Robbins approached Jenson, the owner of a hard-money lending business,
and asked Jenson for $8 million. Robbins explained
that Vtrax was pursuing the acquisition of Mongoose but that in order for the acquisition to be finalized Robbins needed $8 million to buyout C &
W's interest in Vtrax. After several negotiations,
Jenson agreed to loan Robbins the $8 million necessary for the C & W buyout.
H 7 Jenson told Robbins that $4 million of the
$8 million loan would come from Jenson's own
money and Jenson would borrow the other $4 million from someone else. Accordingly, Jenson approached Bodell about the possibility of borrowing
$4 million. Jenson informed Bodell that the $4 million Bodell contributed would be loaned to Robbins
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for the C & W buyout. Jenson also informed Bodell
that Robbins was pursing the acquisition of Mongoose. Jenson had known Bodell for many years,
and Bodell had recently loaned Jenson $1 million in
a separate transaction. Yet Bodell was hesitant
about lending such a large sum of money to Jenson
without knowing the stability of Vtrax.
f 8 Jenson relayed Bodell's concerns to Robbins. Subsequently, Robbins approached Benjamin
Lightner, Robbins's private banker at Bank One,
and asked Lightner to draft a letter representing the
stability of Vtrax. On August 22, 2000, Lightner
wrote a letter (the "Lightner Letter") addressed to
"Whom It May Concern.** The Lightner Letter indicated that Robbins and Jenson would be depositing $165 million into a Bank One account for
MadTrax, the company created by Robbins to pursue the acquisition of Mongoose. The deposit was
to come from a loan agreement between MadTrax
and Arimex Investments. In actuality, there was no
loan agreement between MadTrax and Arimex.
Still, Robbins gave a copy of the Lightner Letter to
Jenson, who in turn gave a copy to Bodell,
H 9 Eight days after the Lightner Letter was
written, Bodell loaned $4 million to Jenson. As
planned, Jenson then took the $4 million from the
Bodell loan and $4 million of his own money and
loaned $8 million to Robbins to buy out C & W.
Robbins paid C & W the required $8 million and
obtained full control of Vtrax. Two months later,
Robbins's efforts to acquire Mongoose failed and
Vtrax collapsed. Robbins defaulted on his loan payment to Jenson, and, subsequently, Jenson defaulted
on his repayment obligation to Bodell.
H 10 On March 18, 2003, Bodell and Jenson
entered into a settlement agreement whereby Bodell
released Jenson from all tort and contract claims in
exchange for $3 million. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the
settlement agreement state as follows:
1. Contemporaneous with the execution and delivery of this Agreement, [Jenson] has caused
$3,000,000 in immediately available funds to be

delivered to [Bodell], [Bodell] hereby acknowledges receipt of such funds.
2. Each of Bodell and BCC, for himself, itself,
their affiliates and for all persons or entities
claiming by, through or under him, it or them,
hereby (a) releases, acquits, waives and forever
discharges MSF, its affiliates and their respective
members, managers, officers, employees and
agents (each, including without limitation Jenson, an "MSF Party") from any and all claims,
allegations of fraud, charges, demands, losses,
damages, obligations, liabilities, grievances,
causes of action, or suits at law and equity of
whatsoever kind and nature, expenses, costs and
attorneys fees, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, liquidated or unliquidated
(each, a "Claim"), arising out of all past affiliations and transactions among Bodell, BCC and
any MSF Party, including, but not limited to, the
Loans and all related arrangements and transactions, (b) without limiting the generality of the
foregoing, *938 acknowledges and agrees that the
obligations of the MSF Parties in connection with
the Loans, including all principal and interest
that may have been deemed to have accrued
thereon, are hereby deemed fully satisfied and repaid in full (Emphasis added.)
K 11 Four months after executing the settlement
agreement, Bodell filed suit against Bank One and
Robbins claiming four causes of action: (I) fraud,
(2) civil conspiracy, (3) negligent misrepresentations, and (4) unjust enrichment.
H 12 On October 29, 2003, Bank One and Robbins filed a motion for summary judgment. On
March 15, 2004, Judge Bohling of the district court
entered an order denying the motion for summary
judgment filed by Bank One and Robbins. The district court held that (I) the settlement agreement
was not an accord and satisfaction, and (2) an accord and satisfaction does not operate for the benefit of third parties unless the third parties are specifically referenced in the agreement.
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<| 13 During the discovery period, the case was
reassigned to Judge Kennedy. Three weeks after the
close of discovery, Bodell served the expert report
of Merrill Weight (the "Weight Report") on Bank
One and Robbins. The Weight Report included
three new damages theories that were not disclosed
during discovery. Bank One and Robbins filed a
motion to strike the Weight Report, The district
court granted the motion because Bodell had (1) not
disclosed its alternative damages theories during
fact discovery, (2) failed to show good cause for its
failure to timely disclose, and (3) prejudiced the defendants by failing to disclose these theories.
H 14 Additionally, Bank One and Robbins renewed their initial motion for summary judgment
and asked Judge Kennedy to revisit the question of
whether the settlement agreement was an accord
and satisfaction. At a hearing on September 10,
2007, Judge Kennedy granted summary judgment
for Bank One and Robbins, ruling that (1) the settlement agreement was unambiguously an accord
and satisfaction, and (2) an accord and satisfaction
operates for the benefit of third parties. Thus, the
district court held that the settlement agreement—as an accord and satisfaction—extinguished
Bodell's claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation asserted against Bank One and the claims
of fraud, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment
asserted against Robbins.
T! 15 Bodell timely appealed. We have jurisdiction to consider Bodell's arguments on appeal pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-l02(3)(j) (2008).
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1][2][3][4] K 16 We review a district court's
interpretation of a contract for correctness, giving
no deference to the district court.FNI Whether a
contract is ambiguous is a question of law, which
we also review for correctness.FN2 We review a
district court's decision to grant summary judgment
for correctness, granting no deference to the district
court's conclusions, and we view the facts and all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party.FNJ We review discovery
sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard. m
FN1. Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217,
1220 (Utah 1995).
FN2. Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT
43,H 14,48P.3d918.
FN3. Arnold Indus., Inc. v. Love, 2002 UT
133, H 11,63 P.3d 721.
FN4. Morton v. Cont'l Baking Co., 938
P.2d 271,274 (Utah 1997).
ANALYSIS
K 17 We first consider Bodell's argument that
the settlement agreement is a release rather than an
accord and satisfaction. We conclude that the plain
language of the settlement agreement unambiguously demonstrates that the patties to the agreement
intended that the agreement operate only as a mutual release of claims rather than an accord and satisfaction of all claims, including those against third
parties. Next, we consider Bodell's argument that
the district court abused its discretion in striking the
report of Bodell's damages expert. Because we determine*939 that the district court did not abuse its
discretion, we affirm the district court's decision to
strike the expert report.
I. THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT UNAMBIGUOUSLY RELEASES ONLY THE CLAIMS
BETWEEN THE PARTIES NAMED IN THE
AGREEMENT
[5] % 18 Bodell argues that the district court
erred in ruling that the settlement agreement unambiguously settled Bodell's claims against nonparties
to the agreement. More specifically, Bodell argues
that the settlement agreement plainly released only
those claims that Bodell and Jenson had against one
another. In the alternative, Bodell argues that the
settlement agreement was ambiguous and extrinsic
evidence demonstrates that the parties intended to
limit the settlement agreement to claims between
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Bodell and Jenson. We agree with Bodell's first argument, that the settlement agreement unambiguously released only those claims between Bodell
and Jenson. Accordingly, we decline to consider
any extrinsic evidence.
[6][7][8][9][10] U 19 "Settlement agreements
are governed by the rules applied to general contract actions." ™* When we interpret a contract, or
in this case a settlement agreement, we determine
"the intent of the contracting parties" by "first
look[ing] to the writing alone." FN6 If the writing
is unambiguous, we determine the intent of the
parties exclusively from the " *plain meaning of the
contractual language.' " " " Only where there is
ambiguity in the terms of the contract may we ascertain the parties' intent from extrinsic evidence.
FN8 « «A contractual term or provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of
terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies.' "
FN9

settle those claims that they had against one another. First, the agreement identifies the parties to the
agreement:
THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (this
"Agreement") is entered into ... by and among
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a
Utah corporation ("BCC"), MICHAEL BODELL,
an individual ("Bodell"), MARC S. JENSON, an
individual ("Jenson"), and MSF PROPERTIES,
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company ("MSF").
As we use the terms in this opinion, Bodell and
Jenson are the only parties named by the settlement
agreement.™10 Then the settlement agreement
plainly limits its terms to those named parties. It
states,
FN 10. We have defined "Bodell" to include both Michael Bodell and Bodell
Construction Company. We have defined
"Jenson" to include both Marc Jenson and
MSF Properties.

FN5. R & R Indus. Park, LLC v. Utah
Prop. & Cos. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 2008 UT
80, \ 20, 199 P.3d 917 (internal quotation
marks omitted).

WHEREAS, the parties now desire to achieve a
full settlement of all obligations, disputes and
other matters outstanding between them ....

FN6. Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp.,
2009 UT 2,144, 201 P.3d966.

4.... MSF, Jenson, Bodell and BCC have definitely settled all matters between them ....

FN7. Id (quoting Green River Canal Co.
v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, J 17, 84 P.3d 1134).

5. Each of the parties hereto understand and agree
that this is a mutual release of claims and that following execution of this document, no Bodell
Party shall have any claim against an MSF Party
and no MSF Party shall have any claim against a
Bodell Party.... (Emphases added.)

FN8. Id; see also Deep Creek Ranch, LLC
v. Utah State Armory Bd.t 2008 UT 3, H 16,
178P.3d886.
FN9. Giusti, 2009 UT 2, U 44, 201 P.3d
966 (quoting Dames v. Vincent, 2008 UT
51,1(25,190P.3d 1269).
% 20 The settlement agreement between Bodell
and Jenson is unambiguous because it is capable of
only one reasonable interpretation. The language of
the settlement agreement unambiguously demonstrates that Bodell and Jenson intended only to

© 2011 Thomson Reuters.

\ 21 In addition to limiting its terms to the
named parties, the settlement agreement *940 also
specifically names which parties are released from
which claims. The agreement states,
2. Each of Bodell and BCC, for himself, itself,
their affiliates and for all persons or entities
claiming by, through or under him, it or them,
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hereby (a) releases, acquits, waives and forever
discharges MSF, its affiliates and (heir respective
members, managers, officers, employees and
agents (each, including without limitation Jenson, an "MSF Party") from any and all claims, ...
arising out of all past affiliations and transactions
among Bodell, BCC and any MSF Party, ... acknowledges and agrees that the obligations of the
MSF Parties in connection with the Loans, including all principal and interest that may have
been deemed to have accrued thereon, are hereby
deemed fully satisfied and repaid in full ....
(Emphases added.)
There is no language to indicate that the parties
intended to satisfy all of BodelPs potential tort and
contract claims against persons not a party to the
agreement.
H 22 Bank One and Robbins argue that because
the settlement agreement includes the word
"satisfied," we should construe the agreement to be
an accord and satisfaction, or, in other words, to
satisfy any and all related claims that the named
parties may have against nonparties to the agreement. We disagree.
[U][12][13][14][15] J 23 Accord and satisfaction is a common law concept.™11 It denotes the
intention of the contracting parties to "agree that a
different performance, to be made in substitution of
the performance originally agreed upon, will discharge the obligation created under the original
agreement." ftin An accord and satisfaction may
discharge an obligation arising out of a "contract,
quasi-contract, [or] tort." ™li When a claim is
discharged through an accord and satisfaction, the
claim is considered fully satisfied. The claimant no
longer has the legal right to seek recovery from
anyone on that claim.™14 Before we determine
that an agreement constitutes an accord and satisfaction, we must find the following three elements
in the contract: "(1) an unliquidated claim or a bona
fide dispute over the amount due; (2) a payment
offered as full settlement of the entire dispute; and
(3) an acceptance of the payment as full settlement

© 2011 Thomson Reuters.

of the dispute." ™*
FN11. See IFG Leasing Co. v. Gordon,
776 P.2d 607, 614 n. 32 (Utah 1989).
FN 12. ProMax Dew Corp. v. Raile, 2000
UT 4, \ 20, 998 P.2d 254 (internal quotation marks omitted).
FN 13. Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co.t 701 P.2d 1078, 1082 (Utah 1985).
FN 14. See Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on
Contracts § 1276 (1962) ( "Discharge by
accord and satisfaction means a discharge
by the rendering of some performance different from that which was claimed as due
and the acceptance of such substituted performance by the claimant as full satisfaction of his claim." (emphasis added)).
FN 15. ProMax, 2000 UT 4, % 20, 998 P.2d
254.
U 24 From a plain reading of the settlement
agreement, we determine that the last two elements
of an accord and satisfaction are not met. Although
the agreement incorporated the offer of a payment
by Jenson and the acceptance by Bodell in satisfaction of an obligation, the language of the agreement
does not indicate that the payment was offered and
accepted with the intent to satisfy the entire underlying dispute. Rather, the payment was offered and
accepted as "a frill settlement of all obligations, disputes and other matters outstanding between them,
including, but not limited to the Loans." (Emphasis
added.) Thus, the plain language limits the effect of
the payment to the settlement of the claims between
Bodell and Jenson; claims as to third parties are not
contemplated.
K 25 Robbins and Bank One contend that by including the term "satisfied" in the settlement agreement, Bodell necessarily released any claims he
may have against Bank One and Robbins, even
though Bank One and Robbins were not parties to
the agreement. We disagree. The parties' use of
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"satisfied" in the settlement agreement does not alter our reading of the agreement. Indeed, we decline to adopt a rule that overlooks the contracting
parties' clear intent and imputes a different meaning
to a contract simply because the parties incorporated an otherwise *941 ordinary term into their
agreement. "Satisfied" appears only once in the
agreement and is limited by surrounding language.
The agreement states that Bodell "acknowledges
and agrees that the obligations of [Jenson] in connection with the Loans ... are hereby deemed fully
satisfied and repaid in full." Thus the word
"satisfied" does not depict a full satisfaction of all
underlying claims, as is characteristic of an accord
and satisfaction; rather its impact is limited to "the
obligations of [Jenson] in connection with the
Loans." Thus, the settlement agreement satisfied
only Jenson's loan obligation to Bodell. It did not
satisfy any claims that Bodell may potentially have
against Robbins or Bank One for full satisfaction of
the debt owed.™'6
FN 16. Because we determine that the plain
language of the settlement agreement
demonstrates that the parties intended to
limit the impact of their agreement to the
claims between them, we do not reach
Bodell's argument that the Liability Reform Act, found in Utah Code section
78B-5-822, prohibits this court from applying the agreement to claims Bodell may
have against third parties.
[16][17] % 26 Because we determine that the
plain language of the settlement agreement limited
the agreement to claims between Bodell and Jenson, we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment.™17 We now turn to the court's
decision to strike the report of Bodell's damages expert.
FN 17. Bank One argues that we should affirm the district court's grant of summary
judgment on any of seven other theories
that they presented to, but were not
reached by, the district court. To serve ju-

© 2011 Thomson Reuters.

dicial economy, we may affirm a district
court's decision whenever the decision appealed from "is sustainable on any legal
ground or theory apparent on the record."
Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, H 13, 52
P.3d 1158 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bill Nav & Sons Exempting
v. Neeley Corntr. Co.,'677 P.2d 1120, 1123
(Utah 1984); Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass% 23 Utah 2d 222, 461 P.2d
290,293 n. 2 (1969).
We decline to consider the alternative
grounds in this case because we do not
see that doing so will serve judicial economy. The district court is already familiar with the alternative theories as they
have been fully briefed and argued to
that court. Accordingly, we determine
that the district court is in a better position than we are at this time to rule on
Bank One's alternative theories.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE
ITS DISCRETION FN STRIKING THE WEIGHT
REPORT
\ 27 Three weeks after the close of discovery,
Bodell served the Weight Report on Bank One and
Robbins. The Weight Report included three new
damages theories that were not disclosed during
discovery. Bank One and Robbins filed a motion to
strike the Weight Report. The district court granted
the motion because Bodell had (I) not disclosed his
alternative damages theories during fact discovery,
(2) failed to show good cause for his failure to
timely disclose, and (3) prejudiced the defendants
by failing to disclose these theories.
U 28 Bodell argues that the district court abused
its discretion in striking the Weight Report because
Bodell's disclosure of the Weight Report did not violate any court order and complied with the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. In the alternative, Bodell
argues that even if the Weight Report was not properly disclosed, the court nevertheless abused its discretion in striking the report because there was
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good cause for the failure and the failure was harmless. Bank One and Robbins contest the merits of
Bodell's arguments, and Bank One contends that
this issue 5s not ripe for appeal. We first address
Bank One's ripeness argument, and then we turn to
the substance of Bodell's arguments.
A. The Issue of Whether the District Court Erred in
Striking the Weight Report Is Ripe for Appeal
[18][19][20] K 29 A dispute is ripe "when 'a
conflict over the application of a legal provision
[has] sharpened into an actual or imminent clash of
legal rights and obligations between the parties
thereto.* " ™18 An issue is not ripe for appeal if "
'there exists no more than a difference of opinion
regarding the hypothetical application of [a provision] to a situation in which the parties might, at
some *942 future time, find themselves.' " FNl9 If,
however, an issue was "raised, argued, and resolved
by the trial court prior to the entry o f a final judgment, then that issue is ripe for appeal, and the
"failure to raise [it] on appeal result[s] in a waiver
of the[ ] right to raise [it] at a later time." ™10
FN 18. Bd. ofTrs. of Wash. County Water
Conservancy Dist. v. Keystone Conversions, LLC, 2004 UT 84, \ 32, 103 P.3d
686 (alteration in original) (quoting Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County Comm'n,
624 P.2d 1138, 1148 (Utah 1981)).
FN 19. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
Redwood Gym, 624 P.2d at 1148).
FN20. DeBry v. Cascade Enters., 935 P.2d
499, 502 (Utah 1997) (citing State ex rel
Road Comm'n v. Rohanf 28 Utah 2d 375,
503 P.2d 141 (1972)); see also Smith v.
DeNiro, 28 Utah 2d 259, 501 P.2d 265
(1972).

sue. That future scenario would occur if the district
court, on remand, were to enter summary judgment
on one of Bank One's alternative theories, the case
settled, or the case eventually reaches a jury and the
jury finds against Bodell. To support its position,
Bank One relies upon Rett v. Autoliv ASP, Inc.
™21 and State v. Ortiz.™22
FN21. 2005 UT2, 106 P.3d 705.
FN22. 1999 UT 84,987 P.2d 39.
II 31 In Pelt, we granted an interlocutory appeal
challenging a district court's decision to grant a
party leave to amend an answer to plead a particular
affirmative defense.™23 The respondent asked us
to determine whether Utah law recognized the affirmative defense that the petitioner sought to
plead.™24 We declined to determine the scope of
Utah law as it related to the affirmative defense because we determined that the issue had not
"matured to the extent that we [could] know with
certainty the facts and law which [would] shape its
final outcome."FN25
FN23. 2005 UT 2, \ 3, 106 P.3d 705.
FN24. Id.
FN25. Id. \ 5.
\ 32 In Ortiz, two defendants challenged the
sentencing structure applicable to the crimes with
which they were charged.™26 Because the defendants had not yet been convicted, we determined that
the challenge was not ripe. We stated, "there are
several possible circumstances under which we
would not need to address the constitutionality of
[the sentencing structure]." FN27
FN26. 1999 UT 84, H 1,987 P.2d 39.

[21] \ 30 Bank One argues that the issue of
whether the district court erred in its decision to
strike the Weight Report is not ripe for appeal because there may be some future scenario in which
an appellate court would not have to reach the is-

© 2011 Thomson Reuters.

FN27. Id % 4.
^ 33 In both Rett and Ortiz, the challenged law
had not yet been applied to the parties, and we determined that without such application the chal-
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lenges were not ripe. This case is markedly different. Bodell has sought to submit the Weight Report,
and the district court, applying Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 37(f) to the facts, struck the report.
Though it is possible that the case could be later decided or settled on issues unrelated to the information in the Weight Report, the admissibility of the
Weight Report is still properly before us. The issue
has been squarely presented to the district court, the
court has ruled on the. issue, the issue was ripe
when the court ruled on it, and the court has issued
a final judgment. Accordingly, we conclude that the
issue is ripe for our determination.
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
in Striking the Weight Report
[22] H 34 Bodell argues that the district court
erred in striking the Weight Report because the disclosure of the report complied with the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, and even if the disclosure had
violated the rules, allowance of the report would
not have harmed the defendants. Further, Bodell
claims that he had good cause for his failure to previously disclose the information in the report. Bank
One and Robbins argue that because Bodell did not
disclose the damages theories in the Weight Report
during initial disclosures or discovery, the district
court was within its discretion to strike the Weight
Report rather than reopen discovery. We determine
that (1) Bodell violated Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26 when he failed to disclose the theories in the
Weight Report before*943 the close of fact discovery and (2) it was within the district courts discretion to find that Bodell's failure to disclose harmed
Bank One and Robbins and that Bodell did not have
good cause for its failure to disclose the theories in
a timely manner.
[23][24][25][26] U 35 Rule 26 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a party disclose the "computation of any category of damages
claimed by the disclosing party" during initial disclosures.™28 When a party fails to make timely
disclosure, the district court is required to impose
discovery sanctions on that party unless the "failure

©2011 Thomson Reuters.

to disclose is harmless or the party shows good
cause for the failure to disclose." FN29 The district
court has "broad discretion regarding the imposition of discovery sanctions." FN3° In applying the
abuse of discretion standard to the district court's
imposition of a particular sanction, we give the district court "a great deal of latitude in determining
the most fair and efficient manner to conduct court
business" because the district court judge "is in the
best position to evaluate the status of his [or her]
cases, as well as the attitudes, motives, and credibility of the parties." FN3] Thus, we will determine
that a district court "has abused its discretion in
choosing which sanction to impose only if there is
either an erroneous conclusion of law or no evidentiary basis for the [district] court's ruling."hN32
FN28. Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(C).
FN29, Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f).
Rule 37(0 allows for either the exclusion
of the untimely disclosure or any other
sanctions "authorized by Subdivision
(b)(2)." Other available sanctions include "ordering] the [non-compliant]
party or the attorney to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees,
caused by the failure." Utah R. Civ. P.
37(b)(2)(D).
FN30. Morton v. Cont'l Baking Co.. 938
P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
FN31.Mat275.
FN32. Id. at 274 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
K 36 We determine that in this case there was a
sufficient evidentiary basis for the district court to
exclude the Weight Report. The damages theories
advanced in the Weight Report were not disclosed
during the requisite discovery period. During initial
disclosures, Bodell disclosed that its damages
"constitute the funds advanced, together with in-
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terest at the legal rate, less the payment received
from MSF." In response to a request for admission
from Bank One, Bodell clarified that he sought interest at the legal rate as provided in Utah Code
sections 15-1-1 and 15-1-4, which provide that interest shall accrue at "10% per annum" unless the
parties "specify a different rate of interest." FN33
Neither Bodell and Bank One nor Bodell and Robbins had specified a different interest rate.FN34
Thus, the district court was correct when it concluded that Bodell disclosed only the following
damages: "$4 million, less payments received, plus
interest at the statutory rate."
FN33. Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2) (2005).
FN34. Bodell contends that his discovery
responses referred to the contractual interest rate in the Promissory Note between
Bodell and MSF. However, Bank One and
Robbins were not parties to that note and,
therefore, are not bound by it. See Ta)>lor,
Cotton & Ridley, fna v. Okatie Hotel
Group, LLC, 372 S.C. 89, 641 S.E.2d
459, 464 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that
the home owner was bound only to the
statutory interest rate where the owner was
not party to the contract wherein the general contractor and the subcontractor agreed
to a higher interest rate); see also Casaccio
v. Habel, 14 Ill.App.3d 822, 303 RE.2d
548, 551 (Ill.App.Ct.1973) (determining
that a nonparty to an agreement is not subject to the high interest rates of that agreement).
U 37 It was not until three weeks after fact discovery closed that Bodell served the Weight Report
on Bank One and Robbins. The Weight Report included three new damages theories, including the
Benefit of the Bargain Rule, the Modified Benefit
of the Bargain Rule, and the Comparable Rate of
Return theory. Bank One and Robbins moved to
strike the Weight Report because they did not have
the opportunity to conduct discovery regarding

facts essential to these theories. According to Bank
One and Robbins, essential facts included Bodell's
loan history; the loan histories and practices of
those to whom Bodell could have and would have
allegedly loaned money in lieu of MSF; the capabilities of MSF and Jenson to repay *944 or obtain
financing to repay the $4 million loan at the time
the loan was made; and Bodell's expenses, investments, and credit history at the time the loan was
made. The district court agreed: "the defendants
will suffer prejudice if Bodell were allowed to
present these damages theories at trial because
these claims and the bases for them were not disclosed during fact discovery and defendants are
now unable to conduct fact discovery to rebut those
theories." Though the district court could have reopened fact discovery to allow for these theories,
the court was not obligated to do so. Thus, the
court's finding of prejudice to Bank One and Robbins was correct.
T| 38 Bodell contends that he had good cause
for his failure to comply with rule 26. Particularly
Bodell argues that he "complied with generally accepted litigation practices" when he "disclosed its
damages theories during fact discovery and then
laid them out in greater detail in an expert report
produced during the expert discovery period." We
are unpersuaded. As we stated previously, Bodell's
reference to Utah Code sections 15-1-1 and
15-1-4 was insufficient to constitute disclosure of
the "computation of any category of damages
claimed by the disclosing party," particularly the
Benefit of the Bargain Rule, the Modified Benefit
of the Bargain Rule, and the Comparable Rate of
Return theory.
t 39 Because Bodeirs disclosure of the Weight
Report failed to comply with rule 26, allowing the
report would have prejudiced Bank One and Robbins, and Bodell failed to show good cause for his
failure, we affirm the district court's decision to exclude the Weight Report.
CONCLUSION
K 40 The language of the settlement agreement
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between Bodell and Jenson unambiguously demonstrates that Bodell and Jenson intended the agreement to release only the claims they had against one
another, not any third-party claims they may have.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court's grant of
summary judgment. But we affirm the district
court's decision to strike the Weight Report. In light
of the facts that Bodell failed to timely disclose the
damages theories contained in the report, late disclosure of the theories would have prejudiced Bank
One and Robbins, and Bodell failed to show good
cause for his untimeliness, striking the report was
within the discretion granted to the district court by
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37(0H 41 Chief Justice DURHAM, Justice PARR1SH,
Justice NEHRING, and Judge WILLMORE concur
in Associate Chief Justice DURRANTs opinion.
^| 42 Having disqualified himself, Justice WILKINS
does not participate herein; District Judge
THOMAS L. WILLMORE sat.
Utah,2009.
Bodell Const. Co. v. Robbins
215 PJd 933,636 Utah Adv. Rep. 3,2009 UT 52
END OF DOCUMENT .
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H
Supreme Court of Utah.
Ronald L. BAXTER and Shirley Diane Baxter, husband and wife, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
and
Rio Vista Oil Ltd., a Utah corporation, an Involuntary Plaintiff,
v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Robert Rees DANSIE and Marie Grow Dansie, his
wife; Davis County Commissioners; Davis County
Assessor; Davis County Recorder; and Weber
County, a body politic of the State of Utah, ThirdParty Defendants.
No. 19097.
Aug. 26,1985.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 17, 1985.
In quiet title action, the Second District Court,
Weber County, Clavin Gould, J., granted summary
judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appealed.
The Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that plaintiffs,
adjacent landowners to plaintiff in prior action who
had identical property rights, were not collaterally
estopped from relitigating issue of validity of tax
title to the property.
Reversed and remanded.
West Headnotes

topped from litigating an issue, it must be determined whether issue decided in prior adjudication
was identical to one presented in the action in question, whether there was a final judgment on the
merits, whether party against whom plea is asserted
was a party or in privity with a party to prior adjudication, and whether issue in first case was completely, fully, and fairly litigated.
|2| Judgment 228 €=*675(3)
228 Judgment
228X1V Conclusiveness of Adjudication
228XIV(B) Persons Concluded
228k675 Persons Participating in or Promoting Action or Defense
228k675(3) k. Participation as Witness. Most Cited Cases
Judgment 228 €==>707
228 Judgment
228X1V Conclusiveness of Adjudication
228X1V(B) Persons Concluded
228k706 Persons Not Parties or Privies
228k707 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Judgment in prior action that tax title was void
did not collaterally estop adjacent owner who held
identical rights and who appeared as expert witness
in the prior suit from relitigating the issue in subsequent quiet title action; adjacent owner was not a
party to the prior action, nor was in privity with
plaintiff in that action.

111 Judgment 228 <0=>634
|3] Judgment 228 €==>678(2)
228 Judgment
228X1V Conclusiveness of Adjudication
228XIV(A) Judgments Conclusive in General
228k634 k. Nature and Requisites of
Former Adjudication as Ground of Estoppel in
General. Most Cited Cases
To determine when, a party is collaterally es-

©2011 Thomson Reuters.

228 Judgment
228X1V Conclusiveness of Adjudication
228XIV(B) Persons Concluded
228k678 Privity in General
228k678(2) k. What Constitutes Privity in General. Most Cited Cases
For purposes of determining whether a person
is collaterally estopped from relitigating an issue
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decided in a prior action, sole fact that the person
was a witness in the action does not, by itself, establish privity with any parties to that action; to establish privity, the witness also must have had some
control over the litigation, and it is of no consequence that witness afterward employs the same
attorney,
*U67 Glen E. Fuller, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs
and appellants.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Stephen C. Ward,
Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, Brent D. Johns,
Ogden, for defendant, third-party plaintiff and respondent.
HOWE, Justice:
In this quiet title action, defendant Utah Department of Transportation moved for and was
granted summary judgment in the trial court on the
basis that a judgment in a prior action collaterally
estopped plaintiffs from bringing this action.
Plaintiffs appeal, claiming that the prior action does
not bind them since they were neither party nor
privy to it.
At a Davis County tax sale in 1969, plaintiff
Ronald L. Baxter, together with Ronald Toone and
Thomas Hollberg (owner of plaintiff Rio Vista Oil),
purchased an 18-acre tract of land from defendant
Davis County. The deed was issued to the three
purchasers as tenants in common. In 1970, they
split the 18 acres by quitclaiming to each other, so
as to give each of them full ownership of a 6-acre
parcel. The entire 18 acres lie north of the present
course of the *1168 Weber River, which ostensibly
marks the south boundary of Weber County and the
north boundary of Davis County.

moved. Johnson defended, claiming that Toone did
not own the land because it was north of the river,
putting it in Weber County; thus the Davis County
tax title under which he claimed title was void. The
parties stipulated that the location of the Weber
River upon statehood (January 4, 1896) marked the
boundary between Weber and Davis Counties.
Toone argued that in 1896 the river was located
1,000 feet north of its present location and that the
land was then and is still in Davis County, making
valid the tax title. A jury upheld Johnson's defense
and denied Toone's claim for damages.
Defendants contend that plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from bringing this action because the
boundary between Davis and Weber Counties was
established in the Toone action for all three of the
grantees of the tax title. They urge that Baxter, in
particular, is collaterally estopped because he was a
witness at the trial of the Toone action, was fully
acquainted with the character and objective of
Toone's action, and was interested in the results of
that action because a favorable ruling there would
have validated the title to his land. They further
urge that he afterward retained Toone's lawyer to
bring this action, which was tried by the same judge
who presided over Toone's jury trial.
[1] In Searle Brothers v. Searle. Utah, 588 P.2d
689 (1978), we adopted the test set forth in
Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust <£
Savings Association, 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892
(1942), to determine when a party is collaterally estopped from litigating an issue:
1. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication
identical with the one presented in the action in
question?
2. Was there afinaljudgment on the merits?

In 1975, LeGrande Johnson Construction Company, a contractor doing work for the Utah Department of Transportation, entered onto Toone's parcel
(the westerly six acres) and began removing road
building materials. Toone brought an action against
Johnson to recover the value of the materials re-

3. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication?
Searle Brothers also recognized an additional
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element later added by the California Supreme
Court in Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Insurance Co., 58 Cal.2d 601, 25 Cal.Rptr. 559, 375
P.2d 439 (1962), cert, denied, 372 U.S. 966, 83
S.Ct. 1091,10 L.Ed.2d 130 (1963), namely:
4. Was the issue in the first case completely,
fully, and fairly litigated?
If any of these four elements are not satisfied,
then summary judgment based on the doctrine of
collateral estoppel is not available. Wilde v. MidCentury Insurance Co.t Utah, 635 P.2d 417 (1981);
see Robertson v. Campbell, Utah, 674 P.2d 1226
(1983); Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485
P.2d 1044(1971).
[2][3] Collateral estoppel cannot be invoked in
this instance because Baxter was not a party to the
Toone action, see Bank of Vernal v. Uintah County,
122 Utah 410, 250 P.2d 581 (1952), and there was
no privity between Baxter and Toone, see Nielson
v. Droubay, Utah, 652 P.2d 1293 (1982);
Ruffinengo v. Miller, Utah, 579 P.2d 342 (1978).
Toone alone was the plaintiff in the prior action.
Although Baxter owned the tract adjoining Toone's
tract, no materials were taken from the Baxter property by Johnson Construction Company. Even assuming that Baxter had the right to intervene in the
Toone suit, we have held that where a party has a
right to intervene but fails to do so, he is not bound
by the judgment. Searle Brothers v. Searle, supra.
Baxter's only direct connection with the Toone suit
was that he appeared as an expert witness for
Toone, furnishing surveying testimony. Defendant
does not claim and there is nothing before us to
suggest that Baxter had any control over the Toone
litigation. It is widely held that the sole fact that a
person is a witness in M169 an action does not, by
itself, establish privity with any of the parties to
that action. To establish privity, the witness also
must have had some control over the litigation.
Rynearson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 43
Or.App. 943, 607 P.2d 738 (1979); Elliott v.
Brown, Alaska, 569 P.2d 1323 (1977); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 39 (nonparty

who controls action is bound by judgment). It is of
no consequence that the witness afterward employs
the same attorney. Rynearson v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., supra; In re Estate of Richardson, 250
Iowa 275, 93 N.W.2d 777 (1958). Some of the
cases stress that in order to establish privity the witness in the prior action must have had the right to
appeal. Crockett v. Harrison, 26 IlLApp.2d 9, 167
N.E.2d 428 (1960); Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.
v. Patrick, 131 Ind.App. 105, 166 N.E.2d 654
(I960); see also Ruffinengo v. Miller, supra. That
the witness had some interest in the outcome of the
case is immaterial if he lacked control over the trial. Parker v. Schmeltekopf Tex.Civ.App., 504
S.W,2d 817 (1974). Nor is an adjoining landowner
in privity with his neighbor simply because they
may have identical rights. Ruffinengo v. Miller,
supra.
We recognize that a few jurisdictions hold that
a party who does nothing more than appear as a
witness is bound by the action, Desimone v. Spence,
51 Wash.2d 412, 318 P.2d 959 (1957), especially
where the witness could have intervened, but chose
not to, Bacon v. Gardner, 38 Wash.2d 299, 229
P.2d 523 (1951); Moreland v. Meade, 162 Md. 95,
159 A. 101 (1932). We decline to follow those jurisdictions since we resolve all doubts in favor of
permitting parties to have their day in court on the
merits of a controversy. Ruffinengo v. Miller,
supra. We do note, however, that in some of the
cases cited by defendant in support of invoking collateral estoppel, the witness had some additional interest in the outcome of the litigation. For example,
in Talbot v, Quaker-State Oil Refining Co., 104
F,2d 967 (3d Cir.1939), the witness was, in addition, a joint owner of the patent sued upon by the
plaintiff. In Terry & Wright of Keniuckv v. Crick,
Ky., 418 S.W.2d 217 (1967), the general rule that
solely appearing as a witness is insufficient was recognized, but collateral estoppel was invoked there
because the plaintiffs claim in the prior action actually included an item of damages sustained by the
witness.
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We need not address whether any of the other
elements of collateral estoppel are present.
The summary judgment is reversed, and the
case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
Utah,1985.
Baxter v. Utah Dept. of Transp.
705 P.2d 1167
END OF DOCUMENT
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